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Global SOF partnership is a major focus of U.S. Special Operations Command, 
and the United States Army Special Operations Command recognizes its force 
as the best-suited element in the U.S. Army to operate within the human domain. 
U.S. Army Special Forces are the military’s experts in unconventional warfare. 
Accomplishment of these missions is heavily reliant on success at the cross-
cultural, interpersonal level. Each special operator, regardless of unit, needs to 
navigate organizational and cultural boundaries effectively in order to achieve 
unity of effort and improve chances for mission success.   
This research places emphasis on U.S. Army Special Forces specifically, 
and the USSOCOM force more generally.  Selection and training programs are 
discussed to illustrate current efforts to develop cross-cultural, interpersonal skill 
sets, along with the potential to enhance them.  This effort, drawn from 
interviews, identifies themes advanced by deployed special operators. The 
conclusion provides recommendations for training and sustainment of the 
requisite cross-cultural interpersonal skills needed for success, with the intent of 
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Special operators are often regarded as the smart, hard-hitting, precision 
arm of the U.S. military; they think first, yet deliver a strong punch when 
necessity dictates. Over the last ten years, Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
teams have proved time and again their tactical superiority and adaptability under 
the worst circumstances. There is little doubt these men can shoot, move, and 
communicate with a high level of precision. Their skills are constantly enhanced 
through never-ending training in shooting, breaching, tactical medicine, 
communications, vehicle drills, planning, and the like. Proficiency in these skills is 
maintained through “assessment events” before each deployment.  
Intense training cycles are thus both necessary and relevant. However, 
they bring to mind a serious question as SOF strives to maintain competent, well-
rounded, adequately prepared operators. Are these training iterations satisfactory 
in the context of preparing for current and future employment of SOF elements? 
This thesis argues that they leave a crucial void in SOF’s level of preparedness, 
specifically in the realm of human interaction. SOF elements routinely deploy with 
a complete array of tactical training, but little-to-no related preparation in the 
realm of interpersonal skills and negotiation. For example, this author has spoken 
with various Army Special Forces (SF) operators regarding their recent and 
concurrent pre-mission training (PMT) for village or district stability operations 
(VSO) in Afghanistan. VSO is an assignment quite overtly focused on effectively 
influencing host-nation (HN) government, military, and civilian personnel; yet, 
after ten years of counterinsurgency (COIN) practice, the common focus of PMT 
remains advanced urban combat, tactical medicine, and vehicle operations.  
In other words, SOF tends to train the least for what it uses the most. Let 
us consider some factors that reinforce the legitimacy of these skills. Currently, 
the primary focus for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
is global SOF partnership. The United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC) stands as the lead element in developing an Army 
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warfighting function relevant to the human domain, while also enhancing its 
capabilities in the execution of special warfare and the subset of unconventional 
warfare (UW). Furthermore, members of the U.S. Army Special Forces 
community have a time-tested history as UW practitioners. Special Forces 
operators also serve as instructors or advisors who conduct other aspects of 
military operations working with and through foreign partners. In this regard, 
instead of taking a unilateral American approach, the United States Government 
(USG) often employs SOF to work in this inter-cultural realm for a range of 
reasons, from political sensitivity to economy of force. As such, the need for 
operators to master cross-cultural interpersonal skills is driven by our nation’s 
desire to employ SOF as an indirect approach to achieving national strategic 
objectives.  
Each of the aforementioned arguments supporting the use of SOF assets 
in sensitive cross-cultural and interpersonal missions underscores the necessity 
of selecting and training men who can hit with precision and aggression one 
minute, yet turn the emotional dial and broker relations with friend or foe in the 
next. SOF continually operates in over 70 foreign countries, navigating the 
cultural and linguistic mazes associated with managing relations with myriad U.S. 
partner organizations from agencies to NGOs. These dynamics illustrate the 
value of enhancing SOF’s cross-cultural interpersonal and negotiation skills. 
These skills equip the SOF operator to more effectively influence others to 
achieve his goals, whether those “others” refer to a partner unit or organization, 
an agent at the rental car desk, or a vendor delivering gear or services the team 
requires.  
Each SF team, MARSOC team, Special Tactics team, or SEAL platoon 
will possess a wide range of skills and personalities, with different individuals 
best suited to different situations. Likewise, many of SOF’s most respected and 
combat-accomplished leaders are uncomfortable and/or under-qualified to sit for 
tea with a village elder or chat with an ambassador. Most teams know exactly 
who those individuals are and tend to steer them away from such engagements. 
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Appropriately designed and implemented training can increase an individual’s 
skills to a degree that he is capable of maintaining important cross-cultural 
relationships for the duration of an assignment requiring interpersonal skills. This 
thesis contends that such training is necessary for all special operators.  
To demonstrate that a deliberate improvement in interpersonal skills is 
worth the effort, the following example is offered from the author’s personal 
experience as a team leader:  
At one point, the author’s team was deployed overseas advising 
two foreign infantry brigades and provincial police elements in the 
conduct of COIN. In that context the team had various support 
elements subordinate to the detachment. Operating across a large 
area required a good deal of task organization; the Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCOs) carried the brunt of this workload 
and were task-organized to work with U.S. partners and specific 
Host Nation elements in executing the plan. In this capacity, one of 
the NCOs was supervising a support element in coordinating 
certain activities for his sector of the Area of Operations aligned 
with a HN infantry battalion. This NCO was one of the most 
tactically and technically savvy men on the team and had earned 
the respect of the team sergeant and men on a preceding combat 
deployment. He fit the SOF profile of an intelligent but aggressive 
Soldier, with little patience for those who didn’t measure up to his 
standards. Within the team he was perceived as exceptionally 
abrasive, a distinction he proudly embraced.  
One evening when discussing with the author the work at hand, the 
NCO commented that he wasn’t gaining the level of performance 
he expected from his support element. Further, he considered them 
weak and soft, and believed he might achieve better results doing 
the work himself. Having previously observed this NCO’s work with 
the same support element, the author speculated he was 
intimidating them with his aggressive, intense approach, rather than 
creating an opportunity for the young soldiers who comprised the 
support element and looked up to this NCO to learn from him more 
collegially. The author therefore suggested that the NCO step out of 
normal character and approach these subordinates on a more 
friendly and less directive level, as this might allow him to influence 
their work to a greater extent. If after a couple days this approach 
did not appear to be having the desired impact, the NCO would be 
free to report those results and return to conducting business as he 
saw fit.  
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The change in demeanor accrued immediate benefits. Upon the 
NCO’s return a few days later, he reported that this unfamiliar 
advice had “worked great” and had initiated a positive turnaround in 
his relationship with the support element. 
This encounter suggests that even SOF operators perceived as lacking strong 
interpersonal and cross-cultural skills are capable, when warranted and desired, 
of changing their approach. 
SOF needs professionals who are willing to work through organizational 
cultural barriers. SOF’s mission success critically depends on operators’ abilities 
to transition along the spectrum of interpersonal presentation—from aggressive, 
directive interactions to carefully circumscribed diplomatic exchanges—to a 
degree sufficient to maintain relationships that directly enable various types of 
cooperation and coordination. 
This thesis is an attempt to provide hard-hitting, fast-moving operators 
with another edge or tactic that can facilitate their success. In drawing upon real 
examples, it is designed to offer a different approach to achieving mission 
accomplishment. 
A. SUMMARY OF KEY SECTIONS 
This research focuses on delivering a tangible, practical research product 
in order to assist operators in the execution of full spectrum SOF operations. 
Chapter II reviews the value of cross-cultural interpersonal skills for U.S. 
Army Special Forces and SOF as a whole by discussing the utility of such skills 
within the scope of common missions and priorities for the way ahead. The latter 
section examines current procedures for selecting, training, and maintaining 
these skills within the context of the U.S. Army Special Forces, while also 
outlining areas of potential enhancement. 
Chapter III focuses on the methodology employed for this project and 
explains how this thesis explores the problem set of poor cross-cultural 
interpersonal skills in SOF. It outlines the process for dissecting a series of 
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successful and unsuccessful concrete, interpersonal engagements conducted by 
SOF operators (SF, SEAL, Ranger, JSOC) working in 22 countries and the U.S. 
on a wide range of missions. The specific methodology employed involves 
analyzing operators’ responses in order to identify and correlating themes within 
a series of firsthand interviews.  
Chapter IV presents correlational, recurring themes derived from the 
coding and analysis of operators’ vignettes. The intent is to leverage real-world 
examples extracted from interviews to highlight commonalities within both the 
broader context in which the individual scenarios took place, as well as within the 
realm of human dynamics exhibited by the operators themselves under certain 
circumstances. The final section of Chapter IV offers a process for noting and 
responding to key behavioral and situational trends that dictate certain 
adjustments in order for interpersonal success to be obtained in a cross-cultural 
or inter-organizational environment.  
Chapter V offers concluding comments and recommendations for 
improving these skills within both the Special Forces community and SOF at 
large. 
Appendix A expands on examples of the coding process form Chapter III 
by presenting similar data for the remaining themes identified during research. 
Appendix B contains supplemental figures with complete data on interview 
subjects and story outcomes.  
Appendix C contains a brief recommended reading list for the topics 
touched upon throughout this document. 
Appendix D contains the academic literature review concerning the 
underlying theory and research behind cross-cultural interpersonal skills or 
negotiation and the research methodology. 
 5 
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II. OPERATIONAL UTILITY AND CURRENT TRAINING 
EFFORTS 
This chapter illustrates the value of cross-cultural interpersonal skills to 
Special Forces and SOF by identifying common missions and related core tasks. 
It then reviews current efforts toward personnel selection, training, and skill 
maintenance within Special Forces specifically.  
A. VALUE OF THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR 
1. Global SOF Partnership 
USSOCOM is currently focusing long-term attention on building 
international SOF relationships and depth of influence through global SOF 
partnerships. This process will only intensify as the USSOCOM J7, Force 
Management and Development, initiates Joint Collective Training venues through 
exercises and training with partner nations.1 As our force expands the global 
SOF network with enhanced opportunities for training and forward deployed 
service, the success of these macro-level partnerships will depend on the cross-
cultural interpersonal skills possessed by SOF professionals and employed at the 
micro-level.  
2. Unconventional Warfare 
Unconventional warfare (UW), the primary trade or “bread and butter” of 
Army Special Forces, is defined by USASOC as follows: 
Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow 
a government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.2 
1 William R. McRaven, “USSOCOM Commander’s Training and Education Guidance, Fiscal 
Years 2014-17,” (MacDill AFB, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013).  
2 United States Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022,” Special Warfare 26, no. 2 
(2013): 10.  
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As the definition suggests, most activities falling under the UW umbrella 
involve operating with or through partners in order to manipulate foreign political 
and human terrain in sensitive, high-risk environments. This thesis asserts, 
however, that real influence cannot be bought, especially under conditions where 
survival is at stake; rather, it is earned through genuine human trust. Social 
movement theory (SMT), a crucial tool in executing successful UW, similarly 
relies on building high leverage relationships throughout the target populace in 
key nodes. SMT involves determining what groups impact critical swaths of a 
given population, embedding with these groups, identifying an internal influencer, 
gaining that influencer’s trust, and using that trust to garner support of the larger 
entity.3 Furthermore, SMT relies on strategic framing and messaging, both of 
which require attaining the perspective of the target audience. As such, 
successful UW necessitates direct interpersonal influence and the acquisition of 
sufficient local perspective to impact decision-making on a wide scale. This will 
not occur unless operators are adept at building cross-cultural interpersonal 
relationships. 
3. Foreign Internal Defense and Other Foreign Training 
Foreign internal defense (FID) and foreign training supporting 
counterterrorism (CT), or counter narcotics (CN), are routine SOF missions 
conducted in many countries around the world. The operators interviewed for this 
thesis alone have collectively conducted such missions in 19 separate countries. 
With few exceptions, units executing these assignments work under the chief of 
mission’s (COM) authority, or with his or her concurrence, and coordinate or 
directly partner with various subordinate offices and agencies.  
These missions compel operators to wear multiple hats, both literally and 
figuratively, as they traverse the engagement spectrum from training or meeting 
with locals to briefing an ambassador. To navigate this reality, SOF needs 
3 Doowan Lee, “DA3800: Seminar on Social Movements and Unconventional Warfare” (lecture at 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2013). 
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operators who can collaborate and influence within various domains. The 
communication style used with a fellow HN operator may be inappropriate inside 
the embassy gates, but encountering the juxtaposition of these contexts in a 
single day’s work is likely, if not assured, for operators assuming these mission 
sets. And while some of the most valuable lessons captured during research for 
this thesis were gleaned through descriptions of failure in a combat environment, 
historical and political sensitivities are unlikely to permit the same margin of error 
with regard to interpersonal engagements that U.S. forces experienced in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. Future cross-cultural scenarios will demand solutions informed by 
both interpersonal and kinetic approaches.   
4. Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action 
Some within the special operations community might consider special 
reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) as core tasks void of any need for 
interpersonal skills. Yet the 20 operators interviewed for this research from SF, 
SEAL, Ranger, and JSOC organizations indicated otherwise. Every one 
mentioned influencing HN or U.S. partners in the planning or execution of SR or 
DA missions. Some operators facilitated the training and execution of police and 
military missions in combat; others worked with partner nation organizations 
focused on CT or CN work. These operators’ experiences suggest a broader 
trend in which unilateral SOF operations are becoming less common.  
When unilateral missions do occur, they are nevertheless increasingly 
collaborative and routinely require the tailored application of interpersonal skills in 
one or more phase. Some examples of these operations include Interagency (IA) 
collaboration, joint coordination, mission infiltration, close target reconnaissance 
(CTR), responding to compromised SR positions, and tactical questioning (TQ). 
In each of these, effective communication is achieved through the combination of 
an operator’s accurate reading of the interpersonal dynamics in the given 
situation, and his subsequent application of an appropriate approach. For 
example, the following experience illustrates a post-assault TQ where flexible 
 9 
interpersonal skills made the difference between one Soldier’s task achievement 
and another’s failure. This situation occurred when a partner agency was no 
longer able to support missions, requiring unit members to handle this task:  
He [the Soldier conducting TQ] had a very good demeanor about it. 
On occasion he would even [be] laughing at the guy [the captured 
insurgent] and some of the answers he would be given, just basic 
standard stuff. But another guy, different platoon, in his questioning 
[was] just not very good, not naturally inclined to do well. Every 
other answer that was given to him, [he] was like, ‘You are lying.’ 
Then he moves to the next question and continued to go, ‘You are 
lying.’ The guy who was not so good, he was trying to be the 
dominant figure and [trying] to establish himself early on with who 
he was questioning. It was almost counterproductive, whereas the 
guy that was good at it was very nonchalant. He would put his dip 
in, kind of have his nods up and just hang out with the guy.4 
In summary, the unsuccessful Soldier used a less flexible, more aggressive, 
approach. Following a night tactical entry, such an approach exacerbated an 
already elevated level of tension and further restricted the opportunity to 
successfully extract necessary information. Conversely, the more successful 
Soldier employed a calm, humorous approach in an effort to reduce the inherent 
tension and develop a dialogue. His approach allowed a more friendly elicitation, 
whereas the former Soldier’s engagement was decidedly a form of interrogation. 
Creating a space of reduced stress for dialogue, even in the tactical context, can 
be crucial for success. Understandably, skills and abilities differ and some SOF 
operators will adapt more readily to the demands of such interactions than 
others. Nonetheless, these variances should not preclude SOF from offering 
more opportunities for operators to understand the value in different approaches. 
5. U.S. Partnership Roles 
Today, SOF rarely acts without involving various U.S. partners in some 
capacity. Eighteen of the 20 operators interviewed in this thesis alone generated 
113 examples of situations in which they were required to influence U.S. 
4 Subject 15, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 15, 2013).  
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partners. Twenty-four of the 96 stories collected directly focused on U.S. 
influence. Nine of these, more than 37 percent, reflect failed attempts. 72 stories 
accounted for influence with foreign partners; 18 of these, or 25 percent, had a 
negative outcome. Remarkably, this demonstrates a higher rate of failure in 
interpersonal negotiations involving other U.S. partners than those involving 
foreign partners.  
Common examples of engagements requiring SOF operators to influence 
other Americans include interactions with conventional forces, government 
agencies, political offices, non-government organizations (NGO), and civilians in 
academia and business, among others. The situation usually dictates that 
operators enter the “other’s” space: SOF conduct missions in conventional 
commanders’ Area(s) of Responsibility (AOR), serve in military liaison elements 
(MLE) on temporary duty (TDY), conduct training on Joint Combined 
Exchange(s) for Training (JCET) under COM authority, or are detailed to various 
IA or joint staff positions. SOF’s wide range of partner organizations necessitate 
that SOF elements be capable of projecting their needs flexibly and in a manner 
that aligns with the partner or partners at hand.  
B. SELECTION, TRAINING, AND SKILLS MAINTENANCE 
Special Forces and SOF at large are well known for their stringent training 
qualifications. At times this reputation helps to establish initial credibility with 
partners. As an adaptive, results-driven organization, SOF constantly seeks to 
enhance its methods of selecting, training, and maintaining the force. In light of 
this cultural emphasis on continual process improvement, the next section will 
review current Special Forces selection and training methodologies related to the 
cross-cultural interpersonal realm so as to highlight successful practices and 
identify opportunities for improvement.5 
5 The following information was accurate as of October 2013. The Special Forces Assessment 
and Selection (SFAS) process outlined was initiated in February of 2012. 
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1. Special Forces Assessment and Selection 
Also known as SFAS, this 19-day course is designed to assess whether 
volunteers have the mental and physical capability to both complete the Special 
Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and to subsequently serve in the Special 
Forces Regiment.6 SFAS uses the Assessment Center Method to select 
personnel based on specified role requirements.7 This method is tied to original 
research on assessment and selection conducted by the Office of Strategic 
Studies.8 The SFAS Assessment Center determines the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities candidates must possess to complete training and serve at the unit level. 
The Center also defines corresponding intellectual and physical baselines, and 
then identifies psychological tests, individual events, and job-related team 
scenarios to use as the platform for analysis. This entire process constantly 
evolves to increase the accuracy of assessments and to reduce candidates’ 
abilities to game the course by using information garnered from previous 
attendees. 
Within this process, candidates are evaluated based on the “whole man” 
concept, a set of Army Special Operations attributes drawn from surveys of 
senior leaders in the SF regiment and historical SF models. The heart of this 
process is Team Week, involving a series of job-related tasks that combine 
physical and cognitive challenges in a leaderless environment. 
The hierarchical nature of the military tends, over time, to encourage its 
members, toward polarized roles: individuals either take charge, or subordinate 
themselves to leadership. But this dichotomy does not always maximize group 
6 Data in this selection was collected during a visit to Camp Mackall for the SFAS class held in 
October of 2013. Comments were drawn from notes made during observation of training and 
interface with cadre. This trip was conducted strictly to collect factual information concerning 
current execution of SFAS and the SFQC.  
7 William C. Byham, “The Assessment Center Method and Methodology: New Applications and 
Technologies,” Development Dimensions International Monograph (1986), accessed November 
20, 2013, https://www.ddiworld.com/DDIWorld/media/white-
papers/AssessmentCenterMethods_mg_ddi.pdf?ext=.pdf.  
8 United States, Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the 
Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958), 26–57.  
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dialogue and input. On a 12-man SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), the 
opinion of every individual counts; the smaller, flatter organizational construct 
means that each man is responsible for contributing thoughtful analysis and input 
to team decisions. As such, Team Week introduces a leaderless environment to 
highlight how well individuals work in a flattened democratic setting, while also 
facilitating better identification of the emotionally intelligent leaders and team 
players. The question underlying Team Week is this: with no rank or position 
provided beyond a random roster number, can men rise to the occasion under 
physical and mental duress, build camaraderie with their peers, and influence 
their decision-making? Activities are monitored by fellow candidates, multiple 
cadre, and the participants themselves, allowing for a comprehensive 360-
degree analysis. 
Such an inclusive approach to analysis is a recent development involving 
constant changes and inputs. The assessed events are largely designed and 
managed by SF NCOs, who comprise most of the SFAS team. Team Week 
promotes the selection of candidates with a higher baseline level of individual 
competence, upon which further training and exposure can build. The primary 
trait requiring improvement, both at selection and beyond, is the cross-cultural 
aspect of interpersonal skills. Despite the relative effectiveness of SFAS in 
selecting qualified SF candidates, the SFAS process continues to focus on 
assessing interpersonal competence as defined within the U.S. Army’s cultural 
domain. Psychological research indicates, however—as Chapter IV of this 
document affirms—that cross-cultural interpersonal engagements are 
consistently characterized by a higher level of complexity than intra-cultural 
events. This points to an inherent but equally correctable weakness in the SFAS 
methodology. 
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2. Special Forces Qualification Course 
Figure 1 below outlines the six major phases of training within the SFQC. This 
section will briefly describe efforts to build cross-cultural interpersonal skills in 
phases that apply.  
Figure 1. Special Forces Qualification Course Overview9 
Of note, instructors in all phases of training can access the collective 
ratings and evaluations of each student, such that positive or negative trends in 
behavior observed by cadre and peers can be addressed. This practice 
underscores a key area of focus for SF NCOs running the course, which is 
monitoring students’ interactions with fellow trainees, cadre (civilian or military), 
and role players. In this vein, student peer evaluations are conducted at several 
9 Slide provided by 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), Camp Mackall, 
November 26, 2013. 
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junctures throughout training. These assist in identifying individuals who may 
have issues serving on an SF team or in the SOF operational realm at large. 
a. SFQC Phase I Review 
Several phases of the course place attention on interpersonal skills. 
Phase I, Course Orientation and History, offers two forms of exposure. First, 
students act as foreign guerrilla role players for the culmination exercise known 
as Robin Sage or Phase IV. Here, a student ODA in Phase IV is paired with a 
group of Phase I students acting as guerillas, and the Phase IV student ODA is 
tasked to conduct a U.S.-supported insurgency campaign to overthrow the 
foreign guerillas’ corrupt regime. This requires Phase I students to act as 
insurgents in a fictitious country while being advised by a student ODA. Role-
playing characters possessing different cultural norms challenges Phase I 
students to gain the perspective of the same stakeholders they will need to 
influence when they return to this exercise as ODA participants in Phase IV. By 
observing the group dynamics and cross-cultural interpersonal communication 
techniques employed by the student ODA with which they are matched, Phase I 
students also glimpse what will be expected of them as they progress in the 
course, and they can learn from other students’ successes and failures. Later in 
Phase I, students receive initial classes on negotiation and mediation. 
Collectively, therefore, this phase provides exposure to a simulated foreign 
culture and baseline negotiation theory.  
b. SFQC Phase II Review  
Phase II, Individual Training, includes the Level C (High Risk) Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Course. Focusing on war as well as 
peacetime captivity and hostage detention, this course provides instruction on 
how to assess and influence a captor under a range of operational 
circumstances. As such, this phase delivers ample opportunity for the practical 
exercise of interpersonal and negotiation skills, building on the exposures of 
Phase I. This is a valued learning opportunity, but also involves a witting partner.  
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c. SFQC Phase III Review 
Phase III focuses on producing SFQC graduates trained in one of five 
initial Special Forces military occupational specialties (MOS): SF officer (18A), 
SF weapons NCO (18B), SF engineer NCO (18C), SF medical NCO (18D), and 
SF communications NCO (18E). As such, the courses included in this phase are 
primarily geared toward teaching the unique technical skills required for those 
respective jobs. Two examples that place some emphasis on interpersonal 
competence are the 18A and 18D courses.  
The 18A course focuses specific effort towards enhancing students’ skills 
through negotiation and elicitation training, delivering briefings to senior leaders, 
and participating in practical training exercises. The interagency perspective is 
introduced through a trip to various organizations in the national capital region. 
Through these activities, individuals in the 18A MOS receive more extended 
exposure to the role of interpersonal relations in their future work. This is a critical 
distinguishing factor in their SFQC experience, as SF officers will be expected to 
serve as ambassadors of their units, garnering support for their ODAs with 
foreign counterparts and U.S. partners alike. 
The 18D course also includes an interpersonal component because 
medical practitioners must be prepared to employ with ease various 
communication styles and techniques while under duress, in order to accurately 
assess, diagnose, and treat a patient. Classes are provided on how to present a 
calming demeanor and ask questions that will elicit the best possible information 
for  medical decision-making. These skills are rehearsed throughout training as 
medics treat fellow students or guerrillas during Robin Sage and in other SFQC 
exercises. Once in the field, 18Ds go beyond honing their interpersonal abilities 
through caring for their American teammates; they tend to also become involved 
in treating HN locals. This involvement opens 18Ds to greater cross-cultural 
exposure and experience, often contributing positively to their communication 
abilities on an interpersonal level. 
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The enhanced interpersonal and cross-cultural training received by 18As 
and 18Ds is important to the conduct of their individual job responsibilities, and 
this training pays additional dividends at the unit level. However, operational 
exigency often dictates that ODAs operating abroad must at times do without all 
twelve men, meaning that any operator may be called upon to represent the ODA 
in a sensitive interpersonal or cross-cultural engagement. SF, therefore, must 
train for the reality that all its members will need serviceable interpersonal skills. 
d. SFQC Phase IV Review 
Phase IV, or Robin Sage, sends students into a fictitious country, 
Pineland, to conduct a U.S.-supported insurgency campaign. Aside from building 
and training a local guerrilla force, students interface with rural farmers and local 
citizens who serve as the supporting auxiliary and underground political network. 
In this context, both locals and guerrilla role players take on the cultural norms of 
Pineland. This becomes a test of the student’s ability to culturally adjust, to 
correctly interpret nuances in facial expressions or body language, and to 
understand how failure to do so can have negative consequences. In this regard, 
Robin Sage is designed to represent a contained environment in which students 
learn to build rapport and influence others, so as to accomplish a larger mission. 
This training helps to deliver tangible lessons learned that can later be applied to 
real-world, high-stakes challenges on an operational deployment.  
e. SFQC Phase V Review 
Phase V consists of language and cultural training aligned with the 
operational area of responsibility of the SF Group in which each student will 
serve. This phase offers four to six months of exposure to one or more of the 
potential cultures with which a student’s unit might be partnered. Learning the 
language and interacting with native-born instructors introduces students to the 
perspective(s) of potential foreign partners. Language skills offer a high return on 
investment if practiced and used regularly, yet maintaining these skills can be 
difficult to integrate into the already-high operations tempo of SF professionals.  
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Nonetheless, language and cross-cultural skills may be poised to take on greater 
importance. Looming fiscal constraints throughout the U.S. military could 
precipitate a funding climate reminiscent of the 1990s, when special operators 
received minimal funding for lodging, interpreters, or equipment for partners. 
These conditions may increasingly require units to rely on their own language 
and cross-cultural interpersonal skills as vehicles for creating influence. While not 
altogether negative – for instance, a greater reliance on these skills positively 
reinforces the importance of gaining trust on a personal level, rather than through 
material means alone – these emerging budgetary circumstances and their likely 
operational consequences strongly underscore the urgent need to strengthen 
SOF interpersonal and cross-cultural capabilities. 
3. Pre-Mission Training 
As mentioned earlier, SF units in their stateside deployment preparation 
tend to train the least on the skills that are most used downrange. Title X SOF 
training activities like JCETs, designed specifically to provide SOF elements with 
exposure to foreign environments, are valuable in helping operators maintain 
related skills and knowledge between active deployments.10 However, JCETs 
and similar training exposures are insufficient to the initial task of developing the 
necessary level of individual cross-cultural interpersonal skills, and cannot stand 
in for such skill emphasis in pre-mission training (PMT). 
Operators interviewed for this thesis repeatedly noted a very limited 
amount of exposure to training in cross-cultural interpersonal skills prior to 
deployments. The most commonly mentioned PMT venue for exercising such 
skills was the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) Course, which 
focuses on training operators in the unique skills required to conduct Direct 
Action in an urban environment. This training module holds clear relevance and 
value to SOF mission sets, but is a less than ideal as a venue for training 
10 Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, “10 USC Section 2011, Special 
Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Forces,” accessed July 5, 2013, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2011.   
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operators on successful influence-based operations down range. Granted,  
SFAUC does provide some counterbalance to an otherwise heavily kinetic 
training focus. In this sense it does address the concern that, if operators’ kinetic 
training is not interspersed with instruction on “soft power” techniques (for 
instance, negotiation or interpersonal communication styles and strategies), the 
training that is received (in this case, kinetic) can become self-reinforcing, to the 
detriment of other skill sets. For example, when units attempting to influence a 
local populace or partner focus more on kinetic activity, this tendency inherently 
reduces their focus on influencing local partners through less aggressive tactics. 
This tendency can reinforce popular support for the opposition and/or diminish 
the ability of the unit to establish long-term partnerships. Such circumstances can 
initiate a spiral of increasing kinetic activity and decreasing attempts to pursue 
more nuanced engagement styles. These operational consequences flow directly 
from training that emphasizes certain skillsets over others; for this reason, while 
the degree to which SFAUC does provide a venue for the exploration of 
interpersonal skills in influencing partners cannot be dismissed, there is ample 
room for its content to be reviewed and rebalanced.  
To some extent, as well, PMT events like SFAUC are victims of their own 
success. SFAUC is dynamic and entertaining and, by design, offers instant, 
readily quantifiable feedback, whereas training on cross-cultural competence can 
seem less uniformly engaging to individuals within SOF culture and generally 
delivers more ambiguous results. These perceptions influence not only the 
opinions of participants, but also leadership decisions on PMT events..  
4. Specialty Schools and Civilian Training 
Special Forces and SOF, in general, have access to a full gamut of 
specialized schools. Many of these training venues offer some focus toward 
enhancing interpersonal skills and abilities. The Advanced Special Operations 
Training Course (ASOTC) is arguably the best venue for honing these skills. But 
it is important to note that operators are screened for this course, and assessed 
during it, to ensure they have the requisite level of interpersonal ability to 
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complete training. Lack of those skills is also one of the most common reasons 
for course failure. 
At their own discretion, units sometimes send operators to a number of 
other valuable courses in negotiation, mediation, elicitation, sales, interrogation, 
persuasion, and the like. Attendance can be individual or can include entire 
companies, and sometimes focuses on detachment level leadership and above. 
Training may be held at the unit or offsite through civilian or academic 
institutions. Some examples include courses with the Harvard University 
Program on Negotiation, or interrogation and interview training by John Reid and 
Associates. Despite the utility of the training, only a limited number of personnel 
receive these opportunities. It is thus difficult to consider such venues an 
opportunities for unit-wide enhancement of skills.     
Correspondingly, operators who need interpersonal training the most will 
often be the last to receive it. Consider how when a company or team has a seat 
or two at a prestigious course, typically abrasive operators are not the first to be 
chosen. Understandably, leaders hesitate to send less diplomatic personnel to 
represent their organization at external training venues. Consequently, a 
situational risk is incurred by limiting the interpersonal training of such individuals 
and then sending them out on missions to encounter the same array of partners 
as their highly trained, or naturally talented, fellow operators. This risk highlights 
a paradox of value in sending the worst operator to some of the best training.  
For example, this author’s outlook changed after completing a negotiation 
course held by the business school at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
With minimal exposure to theory and extensive practical exercise, the entire 
group, including individuals who, arguably, were not interpersonally inclined, saw 
a noticeable increase in their negotiation skill level. Theory set the conditions, but 
the increase in skill level was largely due to students gaining a new respect for 
obtaining the perspective of those they might need to influence, thanks to diverse 
role-playing exercises. That training, the research undertaken for  this thesis, and 
this author’s operational experience collectively indicate that placing emphasis on 
cross-cultural interpersonal skills is an effort worth undertaking.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter overviews the research method, offers reasoning for the 
approach, and provides consolidated data concerning subjects and the 
overarching process. The larger aim of this thesis is to present information 
related to SOF cross-cultural and interpersonal skills and to validate their utility 
through the experience of actual operators. As such, the author conducted 
interviews with SOF operators (Army Special Forces, Army Ranger, and Navy 
SEAL) to collect concrete, first-hand accounts illustrating successful and 
unsuccessful cross-cultural, intra-cultural, or organizational interpersonal 
engagements or negotiations. Table 1 offers a summarized review of the subject 
data.  
 
SUMMARIZED SUBJECT DATA (ORGANIZATION, RANK, UNIT, AND EXPERIENCE) 
SOF Organization Rank and Total by 
Organization 
Recent Units of Service 
U.S. Army Special Forces 16 (14 x MAJ, 1 x SFC, 1 x 
CWO3) 
USASFC(A) x 1, SOTD(A) x 
1, SWTG(A) x 2, 1st SFG(A) 
x 2, 
5th SFG(A) x 5, 7th SFG(A) x 
2, 
10th SFG(A) x 2 
U.S. Army Ranger 1 (1 x MAJ) 75th RGR(A) x 1 
U.S. Navy SEAL 3 (3 x LCDR) NSWG1 x 1, USSOCOM x 2 
Article I.  
Years of Service Years in SOF Deployments Months Deployed 
Average Total Average Total Average Total Average Total 
13.05 261 7.9 158 5.9 117 35.7 713.5 
Reference Appendix C for source data concerning individual experience. 
Table 1. Summarized Subject Data 
The 20 operators listed above collectively provided more than 30 hours of 
interview material, which yielded over 500 pages of transcripts. Based on 
transcript analysis conducted by the author, these operators shared 96 
interpersonal experiences from deployments to 23 different countries. These 
experiences included deployments for combat, foreign training missions, SOF 
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duties associated with embassy assignments, and other related work. Due the 
fact a high number of subjects had experience in Iraq; there is the possibility that 
research results were influenced by an “Iraq effect.”  However, since this 
research was focused on the collective analysis of all the events experienced by 
subjects, regardless of location, analysis of a potential “Iraq effect” extends 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Table 2 below provides a list of each country and 
its associated number of engagements.  
 
COUNTRY DATA OVERVIEW 





United States 3 
Bosnia 2 
Bangladesh 2 












Papua New Guinea 1 
Persian Gulf Undisclosed 1 
United Arab Emirates 1 
Azerbaijan 1 
Total Engagements 96 
Table 2. Country Data Overview 
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This data was collected and analyzed using a combination of the critical 
incident interview and grounded theory methodologies.11 Using the critical 
incident interview method, the author asked each participant to share both 
successful and unsuccessful negotiation experiences where the participant either 
influenced or failed to influence another human. It’s important to note up front 
that the category “successful” or “unsuccessful” was not imposed by the 
researcher; rather, the research attempted to discover the phenomenological 
experience of the interaction and sought to look across cases to glean themes 
that were common across experiences, to allow the participant to consider when 
they successfully (or not) influenced another. The participants disclosed 27 
negative and 69 positive influence incidents experienced in the 23 countries 
listed above. These incidents served as a method for theoretical sampling and 
constant comparison to generate theory.12 Upon completion of the critical 
incident interviews, the stories themselves became the focus of analysis and the 
author compared those experiences that interviewees deemed successful 
against unsuccessful engagements throughout the entire data set.  It is important 
to note that the interviewees, not the researcher, determined whether 
experiences were labeled as successful or unsuccessful.  This thesis is not an 
objective assessment of engagements.  Rather, it is built on the 
phenomenological experiences of the operators themselves who in retrospect 
assessed their own experiences as successful or unsuccessful.     
Following the canons of grounded theory outlined by Glazer and Strauss, 
the author coded the transcripts using constant comparison, inquiring into what 
the data suggested, and determining what theoretical categories emerged.13 
Such a close review of the data did not seek to validate a preconceived 
11 Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development (Thousand Oaks; Sage Publications, 1998), 99-127; Norman K. Denzin and 
Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
1994), 273-284. 
12 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 273-284. 
13 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967). 
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hypothesis, but to surface themes.  The initial coding of each incident was done 
line by line. The process was facilitated through the use of NVivo, a computer 
program for qualitative research and coding. 
The method began with the researcher reading each transcript and coding 
actions or events based on their content. The initial process rendered over 300 
codes.  Codes were tracked for presence (or absence) across all of the 
interviews, grouped into like families, and connected with an overarching theme 
presented in contextual form. Themes are labeled by their family name for quick 
reference. The research identified eight major themes from 20 subjects across 
the 96 engagements. Table 3 below indicates these major themes and the 
frequencies at which they appeared within the 23 source documents. 
 
THEME OVERVIEW 
Theme Family Source Documents Events Coded 
1. Genuine Behavior 23 321 
2. Gaining Perspective 23 299 
3. Mutual Assistance 15 43 
4. Culturally Aware Behavior 17 80 
5. Building Social Capital 21 115 
6. Hanging Out: Informal 
Learning 
22 281 
7. Overcoming Bureaucratic 
Constraints 
21 128 
8. Multi-Group Coordination 17 51 
Table 3. Theme Overview 
The themes identified above are presented in the next chapter, along with 
supporting analysis and direct quotes from the interviews. Themes are applied 
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within a collective process map that will aid in their implementation at the 
interpersonal level and help explain how the themes are intertwined, and at times 
mutually supportive. The intent of extracting trends is to identify and isolate 
tendencies often unnoticed in the larger context of these interpersonal 
engagements experienced by operators. Evidence correlating these themes 
exists in both successful and unsuccessful cases, often with a higher presence in 
the former, versus a lower presence or complete absence in the latter.  
A. THE CODING PROCESS 
This section elaborates on how each trend was constructed from a series 
of similarly coded events, with trends then grouped into families and ultimately 
developed into contextual themes. The initial process involved coding 
approximately 500 pages of transcripts, which rendered over 300 separate 
codes. These codes and their corresponding passages were then reviewed and 
organized into related overarching groups. 
Next, the codes were reviewed again within their specific groups and 
compared against other passaged. This process then delivered a “family” label 
that characterized several passages and codes.  Lastly, the information was 
consolidated into a contextual definition that illustrates the overall recurring 
theme identified within that individual family. The family name was specifically 
used as a quick point of reference for each theme and as the label level applied 
in the process map.  
To facilitate a more nuanced understanding of this methodology, the 
theme of “gaining perspective” is outlined in Table 4.  That family name was 
assigned because each of these codes contained some form of reference to 
perspective. Examples of perspective-taking included subjects offering their own 
perspective as analysis of a success or failure, taking a partner’s perspective 
after a failure, listening or asking questions to gain a partner’s perspective during 
an engagement, or citing the relevance of “the big picture” to their perspective of 
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a single event occurring within the context of a broader relationship or sustained 
interaction. 
 
Coding Process Example (Theme 2) 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Gaining Perspective 




Assessing the situation 
Closed-minded approach 




Frustration in understanding 
environment 
Introspective thought 
Knowing your strengths 










Partner connectivity with populace 
Partner embarrassed 
Perspective justification 




Understanding larger context 
Understanding options 
Understanding partner’s motivation 
Understanding environment 
Western viewpoint 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
 
The Theme: Taking a partner’s perspective or broadening/challenging one’s own—and related 
actions that aid in creating perspective, such as asking questions, listening, or developing 
dialogue—collectively serve as a major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements, and 
as a learning tool to understand failed encounters. This was identified by every operator in all 23 
source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking 
questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach. Reference term is 
Gaining Perspective. 
Table 4. Coding Process Example (Theme 2) 
The next chapter will present this themes and supporting quotes from 
participants. 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING SOF INTERPERSONAL ENGAGEMENTS 
This chapter focuses on the themes derived from the research outlined in 
Chapter III.  Before discussing the themes identified during the research process, 
however, it is important to define the term “negotiation” as it applies within the 
context of this thesis. 
For the purposes of the research presented and analyzed in this 
document, the term negotiation refers to discussions undertaken to reach an 
agreement.14 Such discussions could include scheduling a doctor’s appointment, 
buying a car, choosing a restaurant for dinner with your spouse, procuring a team 
mission, handling a tribal dispute, changing international nuclear regulations, or 
any another such exchange taking place for the purpose of arriving at a mutually 
agreeable outcome. This definition includes any interpersonal engagements that 
involve influencing the decision-making of others, and is not limited to strictly high 
stakes scenarios. 
A. HUMAN BEHAVIORAL TRENDS 
This section outlines human behavioral trends in the context of 
interpersonal engagements.  
1. Theme 1: Genuine Behavior 
Theme 1: Success in handling interpersonal engagements or 
influencing partners is heavily reliant on the presence of real or perceived 
genuine human concern and interest. This was identified by every operator 
in over 50 codes ranging from humility, compassion and appreciation to 
respect, genuine interest, giving, and helping. Reference term is Genuine 
Behavior. 
Humans innately seek some form of evidence that others have their best 
interest in mind; this applies even more readily when it is necessary to influence 
their decision-making, especially when personal risk is involved. Research for 




                                            
this thesis found clear indications that a genuine level of interest in a partner, 
such that he or she even sees you as a friend, is the most important factor in 
creating real trust and influence.  
The following anecdotes illustrate how operators experienced return on 
investment for genuine behavior. The first example is offered by an operator 
whose duties in Iraq often required influencing locals to take personal risk in 
support of the mission. In one case, the unit needed facial recognition on a high 
level insurgent target, and the unit’s experience had decidedly indicated that 
money was not the answer. 
Let me just say you can pay someone lots and lots of money and at 
the end of the day what is going to end up happening is—they get 
out there and they realize that the money is not enough for what I 
[the operator] am risking right now. There needs to be another 
motivator.15 
In his story, the operator recalls spending an unusually great amount of 
time with one local, often six or seven hours in a single meeting. This degree of 
shared time and experience created an authentic bond Sincere human 
connectivity became the driving factor behind success in influencing the local to 
obtain facial recognition of a high level insurgent leader.  He recalled:  
…we had a really good relationship. He genuinely could see that 
there was a relationship, and that there was a friendship. The 
perception was there that we had a good relationship. He was the 
guy that [sic] we were able to send in with minimal money, to get 
the video footage. He got it. I mean he got lucky with the pat down 
but even he came back and was like, “You know I wouldn’t do this 
except you and I are such good friends.16”  
Another incident depicts an occasion when an operator in Iraq was 
developing relations in a tribal area to facilitate sectarian cooperation within the 
nascent government. A friend of the primary local group was killed in Baghdad 
15 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 20, 2013). 
16 Ibid. 
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and the unit’s interpreters recommended the operator attend the funeral. The 
operator’s initial reaction was to refuse.  
I said, “There is no way in hell that I am stepping foot in a mosque. 
Period. End of story.” Like, I can’t go into a mosque.  
Yet, after the interpreters reassured the operator his guest attendance would be 
safe, the operator agreed. The interpreters advised that the operator’s presence 
would be well received by the local partners. The engagement resulted in the 
following: 
So I went to the mosque. . . . It built that much friendship between 
us because it was completely unexpected. Like there had never 
been a non-Muslim . . . [who] took the time to actually care about 
this guy even though I hadn’t personally met him.17  
When operators were perceived as caring individuals the relationship 
sometimes developed into friendships. In the following example, an operator 
developed a close friendship with a HN colonel. The initial relationship began 
with periodic casual visits over cigarettes and tea  The colonel’s niece was later 
hit by a stray insurgent round, resulting in injuries that required specialized 
surgical attention in order for her to survive. After the operator weighed all 
options for procuring such care, to include calling his U.S. congressman, the 
young girl was eventually treated successfully. The kind efforts of this operator 
then served as a catalyst and a benefit.  The HN colonel practiced a unique local 
religion with just over a million followers. Coincidentally, his sister was married to 
the head cleric for this religious group. Shortly after his niece was saved, the 
colonel called and said the cleric would like to meet him and extend thanks for 
the kind act. The colonel and his extended family escorted the operator and his 
men to the meeting. Upon introduction, the cleric, who spoke excellent English, 
candidly raised some concerns he shared with the U.S. regarding a neighboring 
country. He then mentioned that more than once a year his religious order made 
a pilgrimage into the neighboring country, in costume, with approximately a half 
17 Subject 6, sergeant first class, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 31, 
2013).  
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million followers. The cleric then offered the use of his pilgrimage as a 
mechanism for entering this country. The operator summed up the event with the 
following comments.  
The point is that just drinking chai with [the cleric] and just being 
personable…all ends up with, “…we have a clandestine infil 
platform that really anyone can use.” …built on that one case of 
having rapport and smoking cigarettes with a guy. The thing that 
[concerns] me about the whole thing was what I should have done, 
and what I wanted to do, but what I don’t think I am allowed to do, 
is [send him] emails. I think that I made a friend, but on a 
professional level because I think that there is important work that 
could go through [him] later down the road.18 
Developing trust can offer unpredictable success.. Understanding 
scenarios like the one above requires taking a walk in someone else’s shoes and 
seeing what factors influence their decision-making.  
2. Theme 2: Gaining Perspective 
Theme 2: Taking a partner’s perspective or broadening/challenging 
one’s own – and related actions that aid in creating perspective, such as 
asking questions, listening, or developing dialogue – collectively serve as a 
major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements. This was 
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents with over 30 
subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking questions, 
listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach.  
 
Several successful negotiation stories involved the theme of taking the 
perspective of the other. For example, the following comments by a U.S. SOF 
operator reference an incident when his men caught a partner unit syphoning fuel 
from his men’s boats. The U.S. SOF unit was training and operating with a 
partner SOF maritime unit in an effort to identify insurgent activity within an 
expansive network of small islands.   
So [the incident became] a leadership issue . . . like, “Hey put 
yourself in their shoes. They are poor. They are going to try to find 
a way to make money.” That doesn’t make it right. We think like 
18 Subject 16, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 19, 2013). 
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Americans. We go over there or whenever we deploy we have all 
our resources we need. I [told the unit], “It is not the same for them. 
They are scrapping to make ends meet.”19  
Despite this operator’s ability to appreciate his partner’s perspective the men in 
his unit were reluctant to continue training with the partner force following this 
incident. This points to the importance of prior training in interpersonal skills like 
perspective-taking, in order that they not appear too risky or unfamiliar for 
operators to consider implementing downrange.  
The following anecdote likewise recounts an awkward scenario stemming 
from an operator’s dearth of cultural knowledge and failure to gain perspective.  
Early in a deployment the operator determined that the partner force commander 
enjoyed bird hunting. Originating from an agrarian American state where bird 
hunting was popular, the operator thought bird hunting a promising foundation 
upon which to begin building a friendly relationship, so he accepted an invitation 
to go hunting. Prior to the hunt, the partner force colonel had jokingly mentioned, 
“If it flies, it dies.” The operator and some of his men then joined the hunt. Each 
group separated to locate its own prey. The colonel had men flushing birds and 
was clearly doing very well. Being competitive, the operator felt compelled to 
bring in a few birds of his own. After shooting only one pigeon, the target prey, 
the operator noticed a small yellow bird perched in a tree nearby, and quickly 
shot it without being noticed. He thought this would be an entertaining addition to 
his otherwise meager catch. The group then gathered to end the hunt. The 
colonel proudly displayed 20 or so pigeons, and his subordinates displayed their 
respective hauls. The operator then presented his unusual kill and encountered 
this reaction: 
The team sergeant drops a couple of birds and I drop one pigeon 
and then I am like, ‘Oh, and the big victory!’ and I flopped this guy 
down, and right then, like there are ten little Iraqi privates and other 
junior officers standing around the colonel, and this other major and 
they are just like . . . ‘Oh yeah. About that . . .’ I was like, ‘What’s 
the matter? You said if it flies it dies.’ [The colonel] is like, ‘[Steve], 
19 Subject 15, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 16, 2013). 
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‘this is the national songbird of Iraq. Volumes of poems have been 
written about this bird’s beautiful song. The prophet loves this bird.’ 
I mean I was like, Dude, I couldn’t [have embarrassed myself] any 
worse if I tried to. Know your culture.20  
Fortunately, the operator was able to overcome his error through future positive 
efforts, but his experience reveals the complexity of cross-cultural perspective-
taking. 
In the next example of perspective-taking, and specifically listening, the 
SF officer in question was deployed to the Philippines for Counterinsurgency 
(COIN) and partnered with a general officer commanding the local Task Force.  
I would say probably the largest “in” that I had with [the General] 
was that I listened to him. . . . [H]e told me, “[Bill], you are different 
than anybody else. You know? You don’t think you are smarter 
than me.” He said a lot of the American units that come in there, 
which are sadly ODAs, “ . . . try to advise me and tell me that they 
are smarter than me. . . . I have blown these captains off for years 
down here because they want to come in here and tell me how to 
do things. . . . I have been doing this for longer than these guys are 
old.” He is like, “Just listen.” And I did. I just listened to him. 
[Eventually] he got to the point where he asked me, “What do you 
think about this?” He was like, “We are going to do this. What do 
you think?” I would give my opinion and he would be like, “Alright. 
Sounds good.” Sometimes [my advice] had influence and 
sometimes it wouldn’t. Well, he started using me as a sounding 
board; I was advising, officially advising at that point.21  
Conversely, a failure to listen can have both short- and long-term negative 
impacts. The following incident occurred when an Infantry officer (later SF) 
dismissed advice from his Iraqi partners. He was told it would be a poor idea to 
conduct partnered missions into certain areas, and that doing so would create 
undue risk for his partners. The excerpt below explains the hard lesson learned.  
They were right. In fact we pushed it one time, and I didn’t listen to 
them, and we had one of our [partner force] lieutenants get shot in 
the face, like point blank. The guy walked out of the house and shot 
20 Subject 16, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 19, 2013). 
21 Subject 4, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 30, 2013). 
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him right square in the face, blew his brains out. That is why we 
are, like, we need to listen to these people.22  
This operator became open minded about listening after this event. Such 
pre-SOF learning experiences are common, and occurred in 19 of 96 of the 
stories—or 20 percent—referenced in this research.  
Another approach to preventing such blunders as those described above 
is to ask questions. One operator employed this tactic to provide his team with a 
refined perspective on their role as partners. During the team’s previous 
deployment, its missions had been very unilateral in terms of their planning and 
execution. Partners had been treated as a means for executing missions, not as 
a consulted party to mission purpose or design. To foster a higher level of 
partnership, this new team leader started asking questions. For example, he 
asked if all members of the partner force could drive. Most of them were from 
rural homes without cars. What would happen if the few trained drivers were 
injured? This process of asking questions and looking deeper into the root cause 
of issues took place in numerous instances and helped the operator’s team 
rationalize the value of teaching partners to take the lead.  
Yes, and it wasn’t just [with our partners]—that was something that 
we really worked on in the detachment as well because the 
detachment was like, ‘Why are we doing this? Last trip we didn’t do 
any of this. This is stupid. Why don’t we just go? We know where 
we are going.’ We got to start peeling back the layers, and the 
detachment started seeing okay, there is something to doing some 
additional analysis. So it wasn’t just the Iraqis [who] learned from it, 
my detachment learned from it significantly.23  
A key aspect of learning from failure when it does happen is self-appraisal. 
As such, 15 out of the 20 operators interviewed engaged in some form of self-
appraisal, reflecting on their performance. One illustrative example is the 
following anecdote offered by an operator concerning an initial encounter with a 
key partner force leader. Upon initial deployment into the country, the operator 
22 Ibid.  
23 Subject 19, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 23, 2013). 
 33 
                                            
attended a meeting with the local mayor, his staff, and the general commanding 
the police forces for the larger surrounding area. The operator had never met 
these individuals, was not known to the group as the new SF team leader, and 
wore civilian clothes. During the meeting the general lied about insurgents 
captured by his units and alleged lack of activity from the SF team.  
As these untruthful comments continued, the operator became very angry. 
He had received information prior to the meeting that indicated this general had 
nefarious connections, and his lies validated the operator’s initial bias. After the 
meeting, the operator hailed an interpreter and instructed him to approach the 
general, introduce him by name as the new SF team leader, and say that he did 
not appreciate the lies offered in the meeting, and would make it his personal 
mission in country to destroy the general’s power and influence in the area. The 
general was stunned. The operator denied permission for a reply, reiterated his 
intentions and left.  
 Throughout the deployment, the general constantly undermined the 
success of that operator’s team. The general’s actions included imprisoning and 
abusing members of the team’s partner police unit before execution of planned 
operations, or assigning them to duties not related to the unit’s role. The operator 
later returned to the same area on a subsequent deployment to find that the 
general had been promoted and was now in direct higher command of the team’s 
partner unit. The new conditions were such that the general was the primary 
senior partner for the team and the approving authority for its operations. The 
general continued to hamper the team’s operations.  
Concurrently, given the general’s initial questionable reputation, the 
operator’s team had been collecting information on his activities and reporting it 
through the operator’s daily situation reports. This reporting resulted in higher 
U.S. command requesting a consolidated packet on the general’s suspected 
nefarious collusions. The operator assumed this would result in the general’s loss 
of authority. Instead, the general was moved to a new area populated by a rival 
sectarian group and used his position to justify increased sectarian violence. The 
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operator’s actions during his initial meeting with the general resulted in total loss 
of rapport for two consecutive deployments and impacted not only his unit, but 
also other units and local civilians in more than one area of operations. The 
following comments by the operator reveal his self-reflection over that initial 
decision to confront the general:  
Really it all comes down to the very first meeting. Had I just known 
in my heart of hearts that I wanted to rip this guy’s throat out, but 
kept that to myself, played nice with him, sat down and had some 
tea with the [expletive] guy and been like, ‘Hey, look. I know you 
said these things [lies about insurgents captured and the SF team’s 
activity, etc.], but I don’t think they are true. Where did you get your 
information? How can we change this situation? How can I make 
you comfortable with me?’ If I had built rapport with that guy as 
much as I wanted to kill him, it would have, in the end, caused me 
less heartache for sure; it would have caused the FID force that 
was accessible to us, and I know then that just from the ability of 
my guys to train a FID force up and the ability of us as a team to 
use them, I think it would have been a phenomenal force at a time 
when it was super needed in [that area].24 
3. Theme 3: Mutual Assistance 
Theme 3: Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with 
partners, to include acting as a mediator between partners to enhance their 
mutual support, facilitates a higher level of collective understanding and 
positively impacts an individual’s ability to influence others. This was 
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents and includes over 
30 subordinate codes such as mutual learning, creating common ground, 
reciprocal value, and shared concerns. Reference term is Mutual 
Assistance. 
In the situation below, mutual assistance was a catalyst for success and 
also reiterates the value of sincerity in generating meaningful influence. An SF 
team was negotiating for use of a HN home in support of a clandestine operation. 
The best option was a home currently occupied by a local business owner and 
his extended family. Despite being offered a large sum of money, the owner 
hesitated. The owner’s father had a garden on the property, and the father spent 
a good deal of time maintaining it. The father was not supportive of his son 
24 Subject 16, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 19, 2013). 
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leasing the home because his cherished pastime would be impacted and the 
plants would likely die. The operator identified the problem and offered this 
solution.  
Once we told him that we were not going to destroy—we had no 
intent on destroying the gardens—that satisfied him to some 
degree, but his emphasis was on how [were] they going to be 
maintained. So we allowed him to come in and do that on his own. 
So once we made him understand that we were willing to allow him 
access to that area, he was more open to us securing the property, 
and he basically told his son that he gave his blessing and his son 
was okay, even more excited about doing business with us 
because he was able to see my interaction with his father and that 
we were sort of accepting of his father’s wishes.25 
In this instance, money was not an adequate form of influence. Instead, the team 
showed concern for the owner’s father and respect for his role as leader of the 
family. Garnering the father’s approval resonated with the son, further solidifying 
the son’s relationship with the SF team.  
A key aspect of mutual assistance involves how actions are perceived. In 
the following example, an operator became the conduit between his unit and a 
local mayor regarding any activities they conducted in the surrounding 
community. 
Yes, and you know, [I] just kind of felt like it was one of those things 
where as long as you treated that person like they were another 
human being, instead of a tool for you to be using to go out in town, 
then you could pretty much get away with whatever you needed… 
[In] the initial relationship when we came to meet, he came onto the 
base, and we just got to talking, so there was no agenda 
initially…no one had me going in to talk to this guy in order to 
develop this relationship so that we could go out in town. It was just 
we got to talking, I could tell that this was some guy of importance, 
so I just started making the friendship.26  
At the time, recent bombings in the area had injured U.S. forces, restricted 
movement in the local community and caused related concerns with the mayor. 
25 Subject 12, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 14, 2013). 
26 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 20, 2013). 
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This serendipitous initial meeting turned into a friendship and later became useful 
for overcoming the issue of movement within the community.  
In many cases, mutual assistance arises through identifying common 
ground. Identifying with people on some level can serve as an access point to 
influence. For instance, an artillery officer (now SF) describes how he found 
common ground in discussing religion with Afghan partners.  
And, [when the Afghans said] “You know more about my faith than I 
do,” that seemed to make a difference. It was just like telling them 
basic stories about Moses coming out of Egypt and Abraham 
before that and this or that. They loved that stuff being able to trace 
it all the way down. Just that little bit of knowledge and saying it 
wasn’t something that I believed, because I don’t necessarily see it 
as all the same faith, but I was saying that at the time to say, “Hey 
we are all cut from one skin. We are all from one cloth here. We are 
all from the same faith base. I respect that, you guys respect what I 
have got going on.”27  
Because the operator often held Bible studies and served as the de facto 
chaplain for the group, he ended up having the following encounter:  
The senior [Afghan] in the camp ended up coming and talking to 
me about it and how, “There is greater respect for you, Mr. [Robert], 
because you are the religious head of this entire base.” That 
seemed to make a significant difference with how I was seen from 
the Afghans and what they saw as, “Oh, he has a lot more clout 
than we thought he had,” which was kind of a fascinating picture. 
He might not be in charge of the guns, but he is in charge of the 
God thing. 
Subsequently, the SF team running the camp began to seek this individual’s 
assistance for certain issues involving the partner force.  
Similarly, a situation in the Philippines demonstrates how common ground 
can reach beyond differences. A partner force general suggested to an operator 
that they host a local viewing of a boxing match with Manny Pacquiao. The 
primary idea was to invite enemies from the local insurgent group. Initially, the 
operator questioned the idea, but the general insisted it would work because 
27 Subject 19, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 23, 2013). 
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Manny was a national hero. His fame transcended religious and culture barriers, 
forming a national rallying point. The combined planning effort resulted in the 
following success:   
No kidding, like everybody from the insurgent camp walked through 
the jungle, like lines of people with guns and everything and they 
set down their guns at the front of this camp and watched the 
Manny [Pacquiao] fight with the locals from the village where the 
team lived. Like no kidding, 150 people. They [sat] and [watched] 
the fight like nobody cared about who was American and who was 
Filipino, who was bad and who was good. The camp—the bad 
camp and our camp, the good camp, like no kidding, setting down 
our differences for two and a half hours and coming together, like, 
no kidding, drinking beer and watching a Manny [Pacquiao] fight in 
a bamboo hut in the middle of [nowhere]. Like we were everybody’s 
best friends.28  
Such common ground offers an access point to influence groups that do not 
normally interact.  
For example, in the following anecdote, an operator had assisted two 
separate locals, an Iraqi and a Kurd, in reenergizing their respective businesses. 
One local made concrete barriers, while the other contracted crane work for 
construction. Recently they had each attempted expansion into the other’s 
business realm, and the resulting friction drove both men to begin undermining 
the other’s success to the point the operator had to bring them in and mitigate 
potential violence.  
Well, we kept it as just—I kept it light. Kind of kept it friendly. They 
immediately walked in the room and it was, “Captain, I am not 
talking to this man. He is a Kurd.’ The Kurd is like, “I will shoot you 
right now and this conversation will be over with.” Instead of like, 
“Hey, guys, don’t talk that way,” [I responded with] more of a—
laughey, jokey—“This is why I like you guys. You guys are funny. 
You are more like each other than you can possibly imagine.”29 
The operator lowered tension with some humor, and then explained how each 
individual was controlling a different business that offered opportunities for 
28 Subject 4, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 30, 2013). 
29 Subject 11, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 13, 2013). 
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mutual support. This approach allowed them to see one another as 
complementary, rather than as historical enemies. After this, the two men agreed 
to divide and conquer, with one focusing on concrete and the other on crane 
work, so that each would send the other business in his area of expertise.  
In this final example, a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operator sought 
advice from an SF team nearby. 
I just wanted to see how they did business and it was just such a 
better working relationship. I don’t think they were living with their 
guys, but for some reason there just seemed to be some sort of 
glue there. I think it was because they included more of the mission 
planning with the Iraqi guys. There wasn’t as much force feeding, 
whereas I would go down and lay down the map like, “This is what 
we are doing.” I think there was a little bit more like dialogue on 
their part to kind of make the Iraqis feel more part of the game.30 
The following anecdote captures the benefit of this kind of inclusion in 
fostering a partnership.  
So we were living on the base camp with the [Iraqi] battalion, and 
as the battalion did things, if the battalion commander and his staff 
were a part of anything, then we were involved in that. Now the 
maintenance of the camp, so eating, defenses, engagement with 
the locals right around the camp, all of that we were fully a part 
of.31  
By participating in these activities, the operator’s team conveyed a willingness to 
develop the partnership beyond purely its own interests.  
4. Theme 4: Culturally Aware Behavior 
Theme 4: Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an 
effective conduit to creating genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing 
successful relationships. This was identified by 19 operators and contains 
20 subordinate codes such as cultural challenges, cultural difference, 
sectarian rivalry, and authority reinforcement. Reference term is Culturally 
Aware Behavior. 
30 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 20, 2013). 
31 Subject 19, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 23, 2013). 
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Cultural knowledge and associated behavior, or its absence, can affect an 
operator’s ability to influence a partner. However, interviews undertaken for this 
thesis reveal that cultural expertise is relatively less important if an operator can 
demonstrate a genuine interest and shared concern for locals. The following 
example from Iraq highlights the importance of shared concern: 
They had no issues with [us not growing mustaches] just because 
they knew Americans don’t like growing mustaches because it isn’t 
the 1970s. They were fine with that. It wasn’t the big insult that a lot 
of people think it is. Or not eating food because people think if you 
don’t eat this, they will assume you think they are gross, or they will 
take it as an insult…but the more important thing is, it is not the 
cultural awareness, it is just proper respect. If you are going to go 
and do a mission with somebody, you should probably get to know 
them.32 
In a larger sense, though, cultural awareness offers a conduit to the perspective 
of partners. Without it, actions can be misunderstood. In the case below, an 
Infantry officer (now SF) used a young English-speaking Iraqi enlisted soldier as 
an interpreter. In doing so, he had inadvertently created a situation in which a 
low-ranking soldier was passing instructions to senior leadership. When a new 
Iraqi commander took over, this difference in rank was not well received, and the 
new Iraqi commander quietly transferred the enlisted English-speaking soldier to 
other duty. The Infantry officer was frustrated after having spent nine months 
working closely with the old commander and this particular interpreter. 
Compounding this situation was the fact that the new commander had been 
inserted based on political connections. The new commander demonstrated little 
tactical aptitude and never went on operations, yet demanded the respect due 
his rank and position. Under the guise of discussing operations, the Infantry 
officer decided to explain his need for the young interpreter. He initially 
approached the matter with a polite tone. However, his underlying bias for the old 
commander, and his issues with the questionable performance and background 
32 Subject 11, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 13, 2013). 
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of the new one, surfaced. Here is what took place shortly after their conversation 
began: 
[He] starts yelling at me because I am a captain, and he is a 
lieutenant colonel. He could have been just appointed lieutenant 
colonel; I [had] no idea if this guy [had] even been in the military. So 
he starts yelling at me and giving me a hard time, at which point I 
totally lose my cool, if you can believe that, and I start yelling back 
at him. It gets to the point where I am yelling stuff at him, and I am 
not really sure what the interpreter is translating literally to him, to 
the point where this new battalion commander says, “I quit, I am 
done.” He threw his hat on the floor and [yelled] something at me in 
Arabic and he is like, ‘I am leaving.’ …So he goes outside and he is 
going out the gate to leave. Well, now part of my force is now in a 
mutiny, and they are leaving with him. I am like, well, this isn’t good. 
So I probably have 50 guys [who] are throwing their uniforms down 
and going to go out the gate…  
You know, it was like the situation wasn’t as important as the face 
and the honor and whatever else was happening because he 
expected respect because of his position, instead of having earned 
it like the other officers. The problem was, that is a 
misinterpretation…because [as Americans] when we place honor 
on guys, it is because of action and personality and stuff like that, 
whereas with them, honor comes because of position. We had a 
difference of view, so it was—later on farther down the line I 
understood. At the time I didn’t, but like I said, I was 24 years old.33  
This situation resulted in a loss of rapport that resonated for the rest of the 
rotation, despite the commander returning after a week and attempting to have 
the U.S. officer fired..  
On a positive note, the experience had considerable impact on the U.S. 
officer’s approach, as he notes below: 
But, as I got…older and more mature and had to go back a second 
time, I realized that there is more to the game [than] I realized the 
first time. Everything had to happen right now, and everything was 
important right now, my first time there; whereas, when I got back 
the second time in 2008, I realized…there is a lot more political 
33 Subject 2, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, June 6, 2013). 
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maneuvering and a lot smoother way to get what I want without 
having to get into [these] blow up scenarios.34 
Overall, respect and hierarchy within the Iraqi culture were important, but 
the large issue was the operator’s individualist approach to a collectivist-oriented 
partner. Such adjustments are critical to strategic success in engaging and 
influencing partners; negative results on even a single tactical SOF mission, as a 
result of a lack of cultural knowledge, could mean expulsion from the country, as 
the following operator feared while in a politically sensitive country:  
In this particular country…you are doing everything you can just to 
stay there. You are walking on eggshells. So I always had that in 
the back of my mind anytime I had a meeting with those guys 
because you just don’t want to say the wrong thing. Obviously, if 
you [anger them], it is game over.35 
A related concern mentioned in over half the interviews was sectarian 
rivalry or violence. SOF routinely either partner with rival groups within a given 
foreign defense structure, or deal with similar divisions in the local populace. This 
can present complex challenges in building trust or serving as a mediator. For 
example, the following situation occurred during a training mission in Mali, where 
a long time rivalry exists between black Malians and Tuareg Malians. A SOF 
team was training Tuaregs in a camp dominated by black Malians when tensions 
broke out.  
Before arriving, the team had been told that U.S.-supplied equipment held 
on the base would be provided to the Tuaregs after they completed their training. 
This was conveyed to the Tuaregs as a form of motivation. However, the team 
quickly determined the Tuaregs didn’t have enough basic gear to complete the 
planned training. Many didn’t even have shoes or uniforms, much less the correct 
web gear to hold weapon magazines. This prompted a request to the embassy 
for an immediate draw of the gear to support training. It was approved, and the 
team coordinated for the issuing of the gear. However, the supply warehouse 
34 Ibid. 
35 Subject 15, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 16, 2013). 
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was run by black Malians. They demanded the Tuaregs sign receipts for the gear 
and return it after the training. The black Malians began yelling at the Tuaregs, 
accusing them of intending to sell the gear on the black market, whereas the 
Tuaregs argued that as fellow service members, they should be issued the same 
equipment as the blacks. This argument erupted into a near disaster, and the 
operator’s team had to step in to prevent an escalation:  
We stopped everything, pulled everybody back, we tried to iron 
everything out, went over and talked to the base commander with 
the [Tuareg] unit commander, tried to figure out what the hell is 
going on. Basically [the situation] just evolved [into], ‘Hey, this is a 
Tuareg unit, [training on a base with a] black Mali commander with 
all his nugs at the base, and here is your [Taureg] equipment, but 
you [the Taureg commander] are going to give it back to me [after 
training] …You have got the Tuaregs basically like rising up starting 
to revolt, and this is a bullshit type thing where it almost comes to 
blows at the warehouse, like people fighting.36  
Ultimately, the operator brought the Tuareg unit commander and black 
base commander together in one room and asked them both to offer their 
perspective. After they each voiced their concerns, the commanders were able to 
reach an agreement so that the equipment was issued and training continued.  
5. Theme 5: Building Social Capital 
Theme 5: Managing relationships that result in influence requires 
building upon how a partner is perceived by others in the organization or 
community as well as by himself or herself. This was identified by all 20 
operators and contains 30 subordinate codes such as adaptability, 
boosting partner ego, humor, selling, and building others’ social capital. 
Reference term is Building Social Capital.   
. One common tool for success is building others’ social capital. One way 
an operator and his team accomplished this was to hold a “SWAT Olympics” for 
several local police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams with whom they 
worked in Iraq.  
36 Subject 18, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 20, 2013). 
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When the winning SWAT [team] went home, they had a parade for 
them…and all these people…were all there, and they had this huge 
parade. So it built a lot of pride in that SWAT [unit]. So that was 
beneficial, I think. That was like an extra-curricular activity that had, 
like, very beneficial second and third order effects.37 
While broad ramifications are possible through building social capital, the 
approach can be as successful on an individual level by giving credit to others. In 
the following case, an operator had worked slowly to influence his HN partner to 
implement a legitimate process for requesting warrants prior to operations. 
Initially the commander was reluctant to do so, but he had recently come around 
to the operator’s point of view. Then shortly after his acquiescence, a national 
conference was held of all SWAT unit leaders. The operator advised the 
commander that not only should he showcase the warrant process, but that he 
would receive credit for it at the conference. This advice produced the following 
results:  
When we got back to our area, I could do no wrong because he 
knows that him [sic] being important is both good for him and good 
for our mission. He saw that…I was willing not to take the credit 
and give it to him. In everyone else’s eyes, he is this visionary that, 
like, has a way forward, and he is truly [inaudible] with respect to 
the law. In which case, he would be a lot more lenient to anything 
that I would suggest that we should go and do.38  
The same American operator also emphasized the work required to help a 
HN partner.  
But there is a lot of work behind doing something for people, 
whether that is your friends and you are helping—I had one 
[expletive] friend that was driving me nuts, he would ask me a 
hundred times to help him do his backyard, but he was a good 
friend and he deserved it, so I would go over there and bust my ass 
to help him out. Same thing with this [HN partner]. It was like it was 
hard work to be this guy’s friend.39 
37 Subject 18, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 20, 2013). 
38 Subject 2, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, June 6, 2013). 
39 Ibid. 
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Influencing others calls for a degree of adaptability, which is often required 
when working in a country team environment.  
But it still gave me exposure to [the fact that] not everyone thinks 
like a SOF guy or DoD guy. Everyone has their different upbringing, 
especially the State folks—[who are] totally risk adverse [sic], don’t 
want to kill anyone…. It seems like a different day of the week you 
might be dealing with a different personality in the same guy. So it 
is just kind of being able to read what day it is and know when you 
can be tough and up front, or when you might need to compromise 
a little bit. I don’t know what it is that makes you recognize those 
things, but I think it is just having the ability—I guess it is flexibility 
basically—in your own personality that makes it work.40 
Emotional control also plays a part in building social capital and can 
require acting or role-playing, as the following anecdote illustrates.  
Leaders in the operator’s partner unit had a warrant issued for their arrest 
and their pay was stopped. This situation required that the operator and his 
partners visit a judge at the provincial headquarters. During the meeting, the 
discussion deteriorated quickly, resulting in a shouting match between the judge 
and the operator’s partners. Thinking creatively, the operator joined in the 
argument, yelling in support of these men before turning to them and saying, 
“Hey guys, just step outside. This is ridiculous. I am losing my temper.” Once the 
men left, the operator confided to the judge that he had only been acting to show 
support for his partners. He conveyed that he understood the judge’s 
perspective, and asked if they could work out a solution. The tactic garnered the 
following results:     
I kind of worked with the judge there to come up with whatever the 
resolution was. The judge was so excited just to be in on this trick 
that I had played on my guys that he listened to reason. You know 
what I mean? Then when the judge realized I was just playing this 
trick, he was like, that is awesome. I am in on this secret. Just by 
letting him feel [that] he was in power, he kind of listened to reason, 
and he let my guys go.41 
40 Subject 15, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 16, 2013). 
41 Subject 7, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 8, 2013). 
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By validating the judge’s status, the operator helped resolve the situation. He 
identified the issue driving both his partners and the judge. When the judge saw 
that his U.S. partners respected him, he was willing to listen and create a 
solution.  
As the previous example indicates, humor is important and five operators 
mentioned its value in either deflating tension or creating common ground. One 
operator observed this application on the target after a raid.  
Yes. I think so. I think in that particular incident, the local nationals 
[were] laughing as well, you know, and it was—I don’t know exactly 
what question he was asking at the time, but it kind of like 
diffuses—he [the Soldier conducting TQ] was able to diffuse the 
situation. It has got to be kind of an emotional event to have a strike 
force landing on your house and terrorizing you for like three hours, 
trying to figure stuff out, but [the Soldier] kind of like understood that 
and used [humor] as an advantage or diffuse, [sic] instead of just 
making it worse.42 
Such micro-techniques reinforce the five larger human behavior themes identified 
in this section as necessary for influence. In the next section, the focus turns to 
themes predicated upon situational dynamics. 
B. SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS 
“Situational dynamics” refers to circumstances in specific settings and 
situations that may impact an individual’s ability to leverage influence. For 
instance, U.S. SOF often debate how much time should be invested with 
partners, how that time should specifically be spent, if it should be all work and 
no play, whether first impressions matter, and the like. Therefore, the first 
commonly occurring theme is one that tests military culture to some degree, but 
remains a crucial factor when it comes to successful influence.  
1. Theme 6: Hanging Out: Informal Learning 
Theme 6: Learning about others through “hanging out” beyond work 
is a significant catalyst for successful cross-cultural interpersonal 
42 Subject 13, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 15, 2013). 
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influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators and contains 18 
subordinate codes such as playing sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol, 
and living with partners, among others. Reference term is Hanging Out. 
“Hanging out” refers to a form of informal learning or learning by 
serendipity and has been documented in the literature on situational learning and 
communities of practice.43 One difficulty with “hanging out” is the perception it’s a 
recreational activity, as opposed to a productive work effort. In the military, work-
related travel perceived to be more social than productive is often referred to as a 
“boondoggle.” Yet the interviews collected for this thesis suggest that few 
instances of successful partner influence occurred without some social factor, 
while social-interaction was conspicuously absent from almost every failure. It is 
difficult to understand someone’s perspective, build common ground, or be seen 
as having genuine interest without socializing with that individual. For example, 
the operator below comments on how socializing impacted his ODA’s ability to 
develop relationships in Iraq. 
It is not just get in and get the information, finish the patrol, go back 
to the FOB [Forward Operating Base]. I think that [hanging out] was 
an extremely key component of being able to develop relationships 
with [our Iraqi partners], having an interpersonal discussion with 
them, just hanging out, even if there is nothing going on, even if 
they are not doing anything and we are not doing anything. Still 
going over there without a specific question to ask, without a 
specific thing you want them to do and continuing to maintain and 
build that relationship.44 
A different operator in Iraq noted the value that perceived friendship holds 
over material support. 
The only influencing that you had to do was [maintain] almost a 
buddy relationship with them. Like they knew that if we were 
friends, then we could still continue to do missions. How you 
maintained the friendship wasn’t giving them money or fuel or 
anything like that, it was just hanging out with them. Not—and I 
don’t mean that for going to the range and shooting and training—
43 Frank J. Barrett, Yes to the Mess: Surprising Leadership Lessons from Jazz (Boston: Harvard 
Business Review Press, 2012), 93-118. 
44 Subject 14, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 15, 2013). 
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but spending time with them after that. We would go over there with 
them and just sit down and watch some of their TV shows, or we 
would throw in one of our movies… So it was more like bro time if 
you want to call it that, just bullshit.45 
The SF operators interviewed for this thesis relied heavily on socializing to 
build trust and influence with their partners. Those who spoke of long-term 
partnerships in Iraq all noted a return on investment after socializing with 
partners, as did the operator below regarding partnerships in the Philippines:  
There wasn’t a language barrier, and I think that went a long way. 
We just seemed to get along so much easier than, say…with the 
Iraqis and Afghans. You know, I guess it is probably because at the 
end of the day, we are just willing to go back, have a warm beer 
and barbeque some fish heads and whatnot. You know, I think that 
is good. I mean that has always been the glue that has held a SOF 
unit together or a platoon together. So same sort of thing there.46 
The above Philippine example reveals several trends found throughout the 
interviews. Operators were consistently drawn to English speaking partners and 
tended to hang out with them more, which equated to better relationships. 
Typically, non-English speaking partners experienced less social-interaction after 
work, which led to less valuable relationships. In turn, those who were often the 
more difficult partners to influence received less time and attention.  
Language barriers aside, humans are generally less drawn to those who 
do not share their interests. However, the value of pursuing mutual interests 
notwithstanding, SOF typically chooses partners for a purpose, so SOF bears the 
weight of bridging the relational gap.  
This same disparity, however, also occurs with U.S. partners and requires 
awareness in order to seize an opportunity. For example, one operator 
interviewed used the “hanging out” approach to garner support from an agency 
partner during an embassy rotation. Upon arrival, the operator’s small 
detachment had little influence or ability to weigh-in on decisions. Thus, he had to 
45 Subject 11, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 13, 2013). 
46 Subject 15, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 16, 2013). 
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find an opportunity to gain indirect influence through other power brokers in the 
embassy. An agency official mentioned a favorite TV series that was not locally 
available. The operator mentioned his interest also in this show and offered to 
bring in some episodes for viewing over lunch. He then used their viewings as an 
opportunity to build a casual friendship. As the relationship developed, the 
operator was able to use these TV sessions to garner support for his mission.  
I had a way in because most of our conversations were quick back 
and forth, but if I could get in his office and sit there for a half hour 
longer straight, then I could actually start to talk about different 
programs I wanted to do. You know, I became a trusted friend, and 
I had something that he wanted. So even if it was something so 
trivial as a TV show in the middle of the day, it worked out. But at 
the end, that is U.S. to U.S. relationship [sic], but that is how a lot of 
stuff is done.47 
Based on interviews conducted for this thesis, an absence of socialization 
with U.S. partners was identified as a primary contributor to the higher rate of 
failure with U.S. partners.  
Another common route to success is meal sharing and 15 of 20 operators 
mentioned it 40 times in their efforts to build or maintain a partnership. 
That approach actually was taken well because—so [the HN 
partner] basically opened up and it was not just taking one event, it 
was taking every day I met him like at least five times. I met with 
him for lunch, breakfast, dinner…then, of course, when he would go 
out, I would go out with him too. 
Sometimes this high level of persistence and complete side-by-side 
involvement with partners was required to yield the most positive returns. But, as 
the following excerpt indicates, even periodic barbeques or parties can help to 
establish and increase influence. 
The celebration that we had at Ramadan was a single day, but it 
was an entire day of us hanging out with them, not doing anything 
except cooking, having meals, playing volleyball, but that one day I 
think reinforced what we were doing prior to that day. I think we 
47 Subject 7, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 8, 2013). 
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could have done ten different operations, but it wouldn’t have been 
as effective as that one party that we had.48  
As noted in the above reference to volleyball, sports also provided a good 
opportunity for common ground and socialization. Nine operators of the 20 
interviewed mentioned this sports approach. One operator recalled that on a 
combat deployment, the team’s relationship with its partners was initially 
tenuous. However, when the operator’s team noticed their partners engaged in a 
soccer game and offered to join in, the relationship between the units improved 
significantly. This created a deeper partnership:  
…when you knew they didn’t want to go out on that mission 
because you just came in 30 minutes before you got to leave, they 
would still pull something together because it wasn’t so much that 
they were going out because it was the job, it was because they 
were going out because you were going out. So there is this kind of 
loyalty that had been developed. You are going out with friends 
somehow.49 
Despite the positive gains derived through soccer, though, the operator’s 
team became overly aggressive on the field on one occasion, fouling their 
partners and pushing the boundaries of trust: 
From there the relationship was hurt because it was almost like we 
had—you know, you don’t beat up on your friends—well, even 
though they are not technical [sic] your friends, but you know what I 
mean. So then you go and ask for their help to go out on a mission 
and they were very, very hesitant.50 
After this dynamic was recognized, the operator and his unit made a concerted 
effort to deescalate behavior on the field to recreate their former friendly 
environment. This was successfully accomplished and the situation between the 
units improved.  
48 Subject 5, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 31, 2013). 
49 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author,  August 20, 
2013). 
50 Ibid.  
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The topic of drinking alcohol with partners is sensitive.  With few 
exceptions, the U.S. military frowns on consumption of alcohol while overseas on 
official orders. Furthermore, many of the countries SOF elements operate in are 
Muslim. Even so, research conducted for this thesis indicates that it has a place 
within SOF partnership missions. Ten operators mentioned that drinking alcohol 
with partners offered value. Partner units or unit leaders often drank; in fact, 
sometimes not taking a drink was the more awkward choice. Below an operator 
describes a senior American involved in a SOF Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 
in a Muslim country who refused to drink, despite a prior warning that such a 
refusal could be perceived as offensive.  
He didn’t drink, and I just remember meeting with the KLE people a 
few times after that and they kept saying stuff like, ‘Hey, he didn’t 
like what we were setting up for him?’ It was like, ‘No, he really did 
like it, I think he was just sick.’ You know, you have got to make up 
some bullshit or whatever. So I don’t know, you just got to know the 
culture for some of these meetings.51 
Another operator shared an example about the amount of effort that 
developing partnerships takes. When partnered with an Iraqi Commando 
battalion, his team focused strongly on partnership at all command and staff 
levels. Team leaders partnered with unit leaders while the other men partnered 
with staff and company level leaders. But this went beyond purely work 
encounters. The Americans worked out in the same gym, ate the same meals, 
and spent significant amounts of down time with their partners. At first the 
Americans were frustrated at giving up personal time. Later they saw the fruits of 
their labor and grew to understand how this interaction served as a catalyst for 
influence.   
My guys ended up doing that to the point where at the end they 
were, ‘Hey sir, we are having a little dinner. Can you come to that 
too? The company commander would like you to come there as 
well. I would like you to be there.’ ‘Sure, no problem.’ …But they got 
it at the end. Everyone was like, yes, this is now living with [our] 
counterparts. This is how it is supposed to be. It isn’t just we will 
51 Ibid. 
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call you when a mission is ready, and then we will all go together. It 
is you develop the intel, we are here to help you, let’s live together 
as best we can, let’s all go fight together. That is the way to do it. 
Yes, we spent a ton of time together. A ton.52 
Spending time with partners creates opportunities for men to get to know 
one another on a more sincere level, largely through exchanges that occur 
informally, and the spatial conditions that facilitate these interactions for SOF 
operators are much more personal than those associated with conventional 
forces.. 
2. Theme 7: Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints 
Theme 7: Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely 
encountered within  U.S. systems and those of international partners will 
reduce barriers to effective influence. This theme was identified by all 20 
operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as transitioning units, 
lack of continuity, and pressure from “Higher.” Reference term is 
Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints. 
The operators interviewed for this thesis mentioned multiple occasions, 
especially in Iraq, in which they found it difficult to explain to their U.S. chain of 
command the expenditure of resources necessary to build relations with Iraqi 
partners. One reason cited for the difficulty was the need to quantify success by 
the number of missions undertaken and insurgents killed, and this need often 
constrained the operators’ abilities to build legitimate partnerships. The following 
account of a discussion between a team leader and his company commander 
illustrates this dilemma. 
I mean, I was literally on phone calls—I got phone calls from my 
Company Commander saying, “Why haven’t you guys—you guys 
haven’t done any hits in like three nights. What [expletive] is going 
on?” “…[S]ir, I just spent an entire day at the Iraqi National Police 
Headquarters talking to one of their commanders about the locals 
in the area and [current enemy activity].” I said, “Isn’t that what we 
are here to do?” He is like, “No, we are here to kill people.”53 
52 Subject 19, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 23, 2013). 
53 Subject 4, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 30, 2013). 
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The operator attempted to justify time spent with partners as necessary to 
understanding the intelligence picture. He characterized the time spent as crucial 
to developing a trust that ensured partners performed to a certain level on 
missions. A further issue arose when the operator was forced by his chain of 
command to conduct missions, despite his concerns regarding their value. As 
this situation evolved, the partner force leader questioned the legitimacy of such 
missions, making it awkward for the operator to ask his counterpart for 
assistance in executing them.   
Relying on HN partners and interaction with locals to build an intelligence 
picture, not to mention a level of trust on missions, is an underlying requirement 
for SF. It is important for SOF leaders to understand and value the time and effort 
it takes to build that level of influence. For instance:  
I think it is just—so many of us get caught up in what we are doing 
and, you know, like I want to have the A+ product for my boss, 
rather than I will give him a B+ product, but I am going to spend 
some time to really know what the hell is going on here, so [that] 
internally I really understand this place, rather than presenting [him] 
with this superficial product that makes [him] think I might 
understand it. Just prioritizing and managing times, I think, because 
in the end…you gain—it can only go so far, right? You can’t just eat 
goat meat to winning [sic] a war, but you have to—if you want to 
have an understanding of the people and the culture and what the 
hell is going on, like the truth on the ground, you have to take some 
of that time to go and do that.54 
This outlines a regrettably common habit among junior officers who may resign 
themselves to presenting a less than fully accurate picture in order to meet 
command expectations. 
In one case, an operator’s team needed to work with the Department of 
State (DOS) to achieve the mission. However, it was a clandestine mission, and 
he was constrained by not being able to disclose the team’s primary purpose, 
even to a senior U.S. leader. Instead, as instructed by his command, the operator 
provided a mission overview that was intended to be sufficiently plausible to 
54 Subject 7, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 8, 2013). 
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garner the redirection of resources from other efforts. However, the plan 
presented was limited in scope and seemed to describe duties similar to those 
already performed by the DOS. Thus, DOS leadership questioned the operator’s 
true reason for being there, which led to the following outcome:  
Again, the line that I was supposed to give him was that we were 
doing what was our operational deception plan, [ but] he wasn’t 
very supportive of our activities there. The conversation turned 
somewhat hostile in…that he understood that the military and 
interagency relationship was one of necessity in Iraq; he was 
accepting that we were going to be in the area, and he knew that 
he couldn’t stop us from doing anything, but he just was not going 
to facilitate our activities through the course of his activities as 
well.55  
The issue was resolved when the operator had individuals from his headquarters 
fly in and provide the DOS with a full classified brief on their mission.  
However, bureaucratic constraints can also coalesce to create favorable 
or enhanced conditions for partnership building, even if unintentionally. In one 
such case, an operator’s team conducted a JCET in Mexico and was required to 
live in a small closed compound with its partner unit due to political concerns. 
…we were forced to live in barracks alongside the Mexicans; we 
were forced to not leave the compound. So what ended up being a 
directive against my team’s ability to conduct operations or training 
in this case, ended up being a very good way to build and maintain 
rapport with these guys because we were with them 24/7.56 
Most often, though, problems are created or accentuated when operators receive 
pressure from their headquarters that do not take into account realities on the 
ground.  
3. Theme 8: Multi-Group Coordination 
Theme 8: Employment as a SOF operator requires the ability to 
simultaneously manage relationships and influence with multiple 
55 Subject 12, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 14, 2013). 
56 Subject 9, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 9, 2013). 
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organizations and individuals. This theme was identified by 17 operators in 
one code. Reference term is Multi-Group Coordination. 
Operators acknowledged being engaged in, and responsible for, a wide 
range of tasks and relationships, including embassy duty, foreign military 
advisory training, unilateral and bilateral operations, advising of local 
governments and civilians, interagency coordination, and Department of Defense 
(DoD) internal coordination. In the example below, an NCO operator visited a 
partner nation Secretary of Defense when his team’s gear was held up at 
customs in a smaller country.  
I remember being in his office thinking to myself—and he talked 
about [General Schoomaker] he was like, “Oh yes, I am friends with 
[Schoomaker] do you know him?” …but I remember thinking to 
myself…at the time our Secretary of Defense was Rumsfeld, and I 
[thought] myself, this is like being in Rumsfeld’s office. Like, this 
seems odd. Like it was just a matter of—it was sitting in his office, 
drinking some tea, talking about what the team is doing in his 
country and basically [reminding] him of who we are.57 
By comparison, in the example below, an operator identifies issues that 
arose from various U.S. organizations coordinating with the same HN 
headquarters, often including the same commanding general.  
Now this is where you come into saturation of the environment 
where you have 100 Americans—I am exaggerating—but you have 
multiple Americans trying to talk to the same people in authority 
and people who can make decisions. So you have multiple 
Americans trying to influence them, and now you are trying to 
deconflict with what they are doing, with what you are trying to do, 
and then this guy doesn’t want to sit down and meet with 
Americans all day, so sometimes you are there in the same room at 
the same time with different objectives.58 
In yet another case, an operator found himself serving as a conduit among 
U.S. interagency, military, and government entities, entirely aside from his duties 
with his HN partner.  
57 Subject 10, chief warrant officer three, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, 
August 9, 2013).  
58 Subject 14, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author,  August 15, 2013). 
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That same country was a heavy interagency environment, so a lot 
of dynamics between State [DOS], the Theater Special Operations 
Command [TSOC)], CIA, and the Task Force—really, just 
understanding the different cultures—and I was in a pretty good 
position because it just seemed like the TSOC had a very vague 
mission that no one understood what they were there for. The 
Agency and State didn’t really get along, so, like, I just always saw 
myself as kind of the intermediary between the rest of the folks 
[and] the Agency. I was just kind of like a broker.59 
As these brief examples suggest, operators can assume they will need to 
work with a wide range of partners.  
To illustrate better the environment in which operators are expected to 
perform successfully, the next section will offer a series of negotiation diagrams. 
The negotiation process is often complex, even in a one-on-one event. 
For example, in a one-on-one negotiation, both parties at a minimum have 
to consider impacts on multiple levels and, in many cases, actual negotiations 
take place at each respective level. It is vital to understand all of the levels within 
your partner’s immediate organization, how and why they impact his decision-
making, or even how these levels can be used to mislead someone. For 
example, a partner might claim his decision-making is constrained by another 
element, such as his headquarters, when really he is only using a falsehood to 
achieve his goal. To facilitate an understanding of these dynamics, Figure 2 
below offers a visual representation of a one-on-one negotiation. 
59 Subject 15, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 16, 2013). 
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Figure 2. One-on-One Negotiation Chart.60 
In the next figure we see a group negotiation, perhaps between different 
HN partners, local tribes, or elements in an embassy. In this case the dynamics 
of one-on-one negotiation are still applied within the larger context, as indicated 
below in Figure 3.   
60 Author-developed adaptation of a chart presented in the following article and lecture: James P. 
Ware, “Bargaining Strategies: Collaborative versus Competitive Approaches” (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Publishing, 1980), 6; Susan Hocevar, “MN3118: Negotiation for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction” (lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, April 2013). 
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Figure 3. Group Negotiation Chart.61 
Figure 4 below represents multiple simultaneous negotiations taking place 
during a SOF mission.   
61 Author’s enlarged version of Figure 3 depicting individual negotiation dynamics. 
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Figure 4. Multiple Simultaneous Negotiations62 
Operating in the realm of negotiation and mediation with mixed 
organizations and cultures offers ample room for failure. A primary means of 
achieving success with all partners foreign and American is through interpersonal 
relationships. Personal relationships are necessary to ensure that individual and 
unit level competencies are recognized and fully employed. Maximizing an 
operator’s ability to execute at the cross-cultural interpersonal level will provide 
that opportunity.  
The following section will present a process map. The process map 
collects the themes discussed above and captures the ways they mutually 
support one another. The map depicts how, collectively, the themes can assist 
SOF Operators in gaining influence. 
C. THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR 
The aim of this thesis has been to deconstruct cross-cultural interpersonal 
engagements to highlight tendencies that impact both success and failure. The 
62 Author’s enlarged version of Figure 4 depicting group negotiation dynamics.  
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themes are distinct, but operate together to support success. For example, when 
training a partner unit in India, one might make use of the themes in the following 
manner: agree to have tea with a partner after training, which constitutes a form 
of hanging out; discuss family, to show genuine behavior; ask about unit 
concerns, to gain perspective; offer to assist with a future unit plan in return for 
jungle training, as mutual assistance; introduce partner leaders to a senior U.S. 
diplomat, to build their social capital; and mention any problems requiring 
discussion with subtlety, in keeping with collectivist cultural behavior.  
Figure 6 illustrates how effective influence can be executed at the cross-
cultural or organizational interpersonal levels while applying positive themes. A 
list of the positive themes applied here is provided below the figure for ease of 
reference.  
 60 
1. Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process 
 
Figure 5. Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process Map 
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2. Review of Successful Themes Applied to Process 
a. Genuine Behavior 
Success in handling interpersonal engagements or influencing partners is 
heavily reliant on the presence of real or perceived genuine human concern and 
interest. This was identified by every operator in over 50 codes ranging from 
humility, compassion and appreciation to respect, genuine interest, giving, 
helping, and the like.  
b. Gaining Perspective 
Taking a partner’s perspective, or broadening/challenging one’s own 
perspective—along with related actions that aid in creating perspective, such as 
asking questions, listening, or developing dialogue—collectively serve as a major 
positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements and also aid as a learning 
tool to understand failed encounters. This theme was identified by every operator 
in all 23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including 
perspective-taking, asking questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an 
open-minded approach.  
c. Mutual Assistance 
Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with partners, to include 
acting as a mediator between partners to enhance their mutual support, 
facilitates a higher level of collective understanding and positively affects an 
individual’s ability to influence others. This was identified by every operator in all 
23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes such as mutual learning, 
creating common ground, reciprocal value, and shared concerns.  
d. Culturally Aware Behavior 
Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an effective means 
to create genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing successful relationships. 
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This was identified by 19 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as 
cultural challenges, cultural difference, sectarian rivalry, and authority 
reinforcement.  
e. Building Social Capital 
Managing relationships that result in influence requires using a range of 
effective approaches to create perceived mutual interest and find common 
ground. This was identified by all 20 operators and contains 30 subordinate 
codes such as adaptability, confidence, humor, selling, and building others’ social 
capital. 
f. Hanging Out 
Learning about others through “hanging out” beyond work is a significant 
catalyst for successful cross-cultural interpersonal influence. This theme was 
identified by all 20 operators and contains 18 subordinate codes such as playing 
sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol, and living with partners, among others.  
g. Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints 
Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely encountered within our own 
systems and those of our partners will reduce a significant barrier to effective 
influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators and contains 20 
subordinate codes such as transitioning units, lack of continuity, and pressure 
from higher authorities. 
h. Multi-Group Coordination 
Employment as a SOF operator requires the ability to simultaneously 
manage relationships and exercise influence with multiple organizations and 
individuals. This theme was identified by 17 operators in one code. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
These tangible examples and related overarching trends have been 
presented to emphasize why SF and SOF need to focus on improving cross-
cultural interpersonal skills. With the changing face of conflict and the formidable 
goal of building a global SOF partnership, operators will continue to work in 
complex environments where these skills are required for success. These 
environments demand operators who can navigate myriad foreign and 
organizational cultures to influence U.S. and foreign partners. 
The need to improve both cross-cultural interpersonal skills and intra-
cultural skills, a less complex variant, was presented in this thesis through the 
real-world experiences offered by 20 currently serving operators. During a total of 
96 interpersonal engagements, these men acknowledged failing 28 percent of 
the time. U.S. partnered engagements failed at a rate of 37 percent and foreign 
engagements at a rate of 25 percent. These outcomes were largely driven by the 
following eight themes: genuine behavior, gaining perspective, mutual 
assistance, culturally aware behavior, building social capital, hanging out, 
overcoming bureaucratic constraints, and multi-group coordination. But the 
identification of these themes is the simple part: there are no shortcuts to 
acquiring these skills, no magic way to change the interpersonally challenged 
individual on a team from a “bull” to a “canary” in the china shop. Nonetheless, 
certain organizational and individual adjustments can assist operators who aspire 
to positive change in these areas.  
In that spirit, this chapter offers some initial suggestions to improve cross-
cultural interpersonal skills. Some apply directly to U.S. Army Special Forces, but 
most apply to SOF at large. Suggestions are offered in specific sections that 
focus on schoolhouse-supported training, initial SF training, unit-internal 
activities, and unit funded training. 
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Training in cross-cultural interpersonal skills applies most directly to the 
development of a global SOF partnership, operations in the human domain, and 
the conduct of most SF missions, including UW. Likewise, most of an SF team’s 
time is spent with HN elements. The further that a partner’s cultural norms 
diverge from those of the U.S., the more time it takes to gain perspective, build 
common ground, engage in genuine behavior, and attain influence..  
A smaller cultural gap with inter-organizational American partners makes it 
feasible to garner greater returns with less exposure time. The problem is that 
units rarely engage in interagency partnership building and maintenance outside 
of actual deployments. When operators do not interact with U.S. partners until 
deployed, and then only intermittently to meet specific needs, mission success 
may be impacted for all U.S. parties involved. In other words, SOF needs 
increased—and normalized (i.e., routinely conducted outside of active 
engagement in conflict)— intra-cultural exposure with other U.S. organizations as 
well. This assertion is supported by the higher rates of failure, as revealed by this 
research, between U.S. partners than between SOF and foreign partners. In 
addition, increased interaction between SOF and other USG agencies will 
reinforce the success of all interagency bodies in their respective foreign 
partnerships.  
The recommendations to follow will be broad in scope and not strictly 
cross-cultural. The intent is to improve operators’ abilities to function 
interpersonally across the full spectrum of partner cultures, foreign and 
organizational. 
A. SOF OR SF CROSS-CULTURAL INTERPERSONAL SKILLS COURSE 
The widely recognized need for cross-cultural interpersonal skills in SOF 
aids in justifying the creation of a focused training venue and conduit for related 
expertise. Both SOF and SF currently have specialty courses that teach 
everything from Intelligence to advanced urban tactics; many of these selective 
training opportunities require either a recommendation or the fulfillment of certain 
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prerequisites in order for an individual to attend, and while all the targeted skill 
sets they address are important, no single area of competency touches as many 
aspects of a special operator’s job as cross-cultural interpersonal skills. 
Influencing others is the primary avenue to success in SOF and especially SF. 
Because cross-cultural interpersonal skills directly enable SOF to engage in its 
signature “indirect approach,” including the application of other specialty skills, a 
SOF-supported training venue on cross-cultural interpersonal skills would 
enhance mission success both by directly addressing a critical training deficiency 
and by reinforcing the value obtained from other specialty schools.  
The process of developing a thorough cross-cultural and interpersonal 
skills course for SOF could begin with a USASOC level course run by the 1st 
Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). It could be established and 
conducted by a small core of one or two officers and no more than 10 NCOs. 
Instructors would be selected on a voluntary basis from SOF units and would 
also include civilian experts, interagency partners, or academics. Likewise, the 
student population could be broadly representative of SOF’s real-world partners: 
training would be open to any qualified SOF MOS within the community, as well 
as foreign SOF students, interagency partners, and NGOs. A diverse 
participation base would add value to the learning experience and create 
professional networking opportunities. 
Assigned personnel would then be sent to reputable civilian-military 
training venues to learn alongside and interface with leading professionals in the 
field of influence. This could include visits to various units and U.S. country 
teams to further study where problems occur most frequently, with whom and 
why. The initial intent would be to build a shared baseline of knowledge and 
develop a supportive professional network. The core participants, acting as 
ambassadors, would then export their experiences and contacts to similar 
programs and relevant individuals within their own networks. A panel of experts 
emerging from this collaboration would then be tasked with creating a five to 10-
day program of instruction. This curriculum would include instruction in 
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negotiation, mediation, rapport building, and other cross-cultural or organizational 
interpersonal skills, with emphasis on planning and conducting practical 
exercises gleaned from real-world SOF missions. Cases presented could 
resemble those offered in this thesis, updated through communication with units, 
partners, or embassies. Lessons learned in individual vignettes would be 
discussed, reinforced with theory, and implemented in subsequent practical 
exercises, including a culminating field training exercise at the course’s 
conclusion.  
At a minimum, this type of intensive, scenario-based training would offer 
exposure to complex issues concerning various HN partners and country team 
members. NGOs, foreign businesses, conventional units, or government 
agencies could also be included. Attendees would rotate through a series of 
assigned roles in which they would practice negotiation or mediation.  The course 
could also feature guest instructors from similar programs around the country. 
Guest students could be invited directly from organizations outlined in scenarios. 
To maximize the training value of course expenditures, the team of instructors 
could offer similar training events at the unit level, or could operate as a mobile 
training team (MTT). Further course enhancements would include a certification 
process for instructors at the unit level. Ideally, this element would also partner 
with SFAS and the SFQC in development and implementation of testing and 
training options in this realm.   
B. SFQC TRAINING 
Chapter II illustrated what the SFQC already does to select and train 
cross-cultural interpersonal skills. Recommendations in this section are intended 
to supplement those efforts. It is important to establish conditions early in the 
course that reinforce the importance of—and maximize the opportunity for—
acquiring cross-cultural interpersonal skills during Phase I. Potential SF 
operators need to understand up front how this skill set translates to their future 
work. Providing contextual examples of positive and negative applications from 
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previous and current missions would expose SFQC candidates to the wide range 
of individuals with whom operators work, along with the various challenges 
associated with adapting to those different interpersonal dynamics. Such a class 
might include asking candidates about their personal experience with other units 
or HN forces, as well as their experiences dealing with U.S. of HN civilians. 
Discussion would focus on why things happened and how they could have 
occurred differently. This would allow for group learning through shared personal 
experience, and would further the concept of fostering dialogue with partners in 
place of purely transmitting information. Likewise, instructors could share their 
own stories about how certain skills translated to success or failure and how their 
lessons learned have shifted their expectations of what traits are essential in a 
competent teammate.  
After justifying and personalizing the importance of the skill set, 
presentations could be offered on mediation and negotiation theory. These could 
include an organizational and cultural review of a U.S. country team, since this is 
a common partnership. Instruction would review both the common usage of 
cross-cultural interpersonal skills in daily tasks, as well as potential 
complications, such as backside negotiations, that influence a partner’s actions. 
Other training would introduce a range of possible partner perspectives and 
identities and would explore how those could influence decision-making. This 
would include a review of negotiation preparation and one or more role-playing 
scenarios, placing candidates in a partner’s historical and cultural “shoes” to 
more fully appreciate differences in approach, as well as what is required from 
the U.S. side to impact a partner’s problem solving process. Candidates could 
then be given negotiation scenarios to prepare and execute on another day or 
time, perhaps more than once. Additional scenarios could be inserted into the 
SFQC at other points in training; for example, in the 18C course, students might 
negotiate for the purchase of goods or transportation. In the 18D course they 
might have to handle a patient’s family member after an error in some medical 
procedure. At language school, they might mediate a land dispute between 
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families in opposing tribes. These additional, MOS-specific applications would aid 
in steadily building SFQC candidates’ knowledge base and broadening their 
perspectives regarding other organizations and cultures through role-playing.  
As an additional or separate option, students could be asked to perform 
tasks on their own time during training away from Camp Mackall. For example, 
they could negotiate the purchase of a specific car or attend foreign social 
functions during language school. In short, before exiting the SFQC, new 
operators need to understand why these efforts are worth their time. Cross-
cultural interpersonal skills will not be developed beyond an individual’s natural 
ability if they are not justified, taught, and practiced to a degree that provides 
sustained value at the unit level.  
C. UNIT INTERNAL TRAINING 
1. Language Training Options 
Language is an important discriminator between SF and other SOF units. 
Beyond facilitating communication, language skills enhance interpersonal 
relations. By learning a language, the operator naturally develops a greater 
appreciation for the culture. Learning and speaking another language also 
provide a ready platform for discovering common ground and for conveying 
interest in gaining and understanding, a partner’s perspective.  
Applied in this context, language skills reinforce SOF’s ultimate success in 
developing global partnerships. One option for building cross-cultural 
interpersonal skills while simultaneously developing language and cultural 
knowledge and building contacts for the global SOF network is through live 
environment training (LET). SOF could also increase tie-ins with the global SOF 
network by arranging homestays with personnel from partner units. Current LET 
guidance from the commanding general (CG) of U.S. Army Special Forces 
Command (USASFC) already calls for LETs to leverage homestay 
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opportunities.63 Offering this as an option rather than a mandate would enhance 
the utility of the current policy.  
Although any form of language training contributes to cross-cultural 
interpersonal skills and improves the ability of an operator to influence others, it 
is also important to note—as the research for this thesis reveals—that personnel 
can and have achieved successful influence with foreign partners without the aid 
of language skills. In such cases, influence was instead attained through 
implementing the positive behaviors presented in this thesis. Consequently, it will 
not be effective to rely on language training as the sole measure of ensuring that 
SF personnel have the requisite level of cross-cultural interpersonal skills. Similar 
findings were also reported in the 2007 Army Research Institute (ARI) study 
entitled “Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders.”64 The ARI research 
indicated that general cross-cultural competence was as important, or possibly 
more important, than language skills and regional knowledge.65 In short, 
language offers high utility, but needs to be employed in conjunction with the 
other skills identified in this thesis for effective influence to be achieved.  
2. Interface with Local Troubled Groups 
In the context of SOF missions, operators are often required to serve as 
mediators between various sectarian groups that have long-standing issues with 
one another. Within the U.S., there are numerous opportunities for training in 
similar scenarios that could also benefit the civilian community. For instance, 
operators could meet members from rival gangs to learn what motivates 
individual or group action, or exacerbates tension. In some cases, this might 
seem difficult, but would not be more dangerous than many missions units 
regularly undertake. As an example, the Defense Analysis program at NPS has 
63 Christopher K. Haas, USASFC(A) Command Language Program, Live Environmental Training 
Policy (Ft. Bragg: United States Army Special Forces Command [Airborne], 2013), 1. 
64 Allison Abbe, Lisa Gulick, and Jeffrey Herman, Cross Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: 
A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation (Arlington: United States Army Research Institute for the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2007), 34. 
65 Ibid.  
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worked with local law enforcement in Salinas, California, suggesting COIN 
practices that the Salinas Police Department might implement to reduce gang 
issues. Another option could be working with an American Indian Tribe to reduce 
community conflict, improve civil services, or provide some other benefit. The key 
in designing any such program would be to explore options for interacting with 
different cultures or subcultures present in the U.S. These experiences would 
provide near-term, inexpensive opportunities to experience difficult and 
unpredictable interpersonal situations, negotiate or mediate with marginalized or 
disenfranchised groups, and employ the positive skills offered in this thesis.  
3. Land Owners, Businesses, and Government Agencies 
Similar to SFQC instructors working with locals to plan and execute Robin 
Sage, operators could develop relationships with various land or business 
owners in the interest of supporting future training. This might include asking 
teams to form relationships with local offices of government agencies such as the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). SOF commonly 
coordinate with the FBI for law enforcement and justice concerns overseas, work 
with the DEA on CN-related missions, or plan commercial travel with weapons 
through the TSA. Such opportunities could allow operators to navigate new 
organizational cultures. The time invested and relationships built would develop 
long-term partnerships and understanding of how and why others do business. 
The expanded network and common ground established would reduce unknowns 
and enhance partnership on later deployments. Experience gained would offer 
valuable lessons without compromising mission success on a deployment. 
Lastly, such exposure could serve as an incentive for operators who have an 
interest in transitioning to these organizations after they retire or leave the 
service.      
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4. Business Internships 
Business exposure through internships also presents an opportunity to 
develop the cross-cultural interpersonal skills identified in this thesis. This 
presents a unique chance for SOF personnel to operate in a new realm and 
broaden their skills, knowledge, and contacts. Likewise, companies can learn 
from exposure to SOF methods of planning. Internships could be arranged on a 
longer-term basis, such as for one- or two-year primary change of station (PCS) 
moves, enabling SOF to work with select industry partners. Alternatively, units 
could coordinate with key businesses in their respective areas for internships of a 
shorter duration. 
One SF group is, in fact, already actively pursuing this type of personal 
and professional development for its operators. Subordinate battalions each 
select key businesses near their location for potential interface. The units then 
develop relationships and design short-term internships for select personnel. 
Typically, both parties benefit from this exchange of organizational cultures and 
expertise. Failure does not impact the mission or political conditions as it might 
overseas; however, any skills, knowledge, or “network reach-back” that are 
acquired do generate long-term utility for operators and their units.    
Aside from enhancing the interpersonal skills addressed in this thesis, 
these venues would could create post-military career opportunities and grow 
SOF’s reputation in key sectors of business. SOF units – which deal frequently 
with businesses for such purposes as contracting equipment or training in the 
U.S. or overseas, or managing economic development supporting COIN – can 
likewise benefit from increased encounters with private sector partners, which 
enhance the participating unit’s understanding of corporate decision-making, 
finance, logistics, and other key organizational functions, all while developing a 
critical capability in the human domain.  
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5. U.S.-Based Foreign Interface 
Most large cities throughout the U.S. have neighborhoods or even 
commercial areas populated by people from various foreign cultures. In some 
cases these might even include refugees. Finding time to meet these people, 
either through local assistance groups or just by visiting the area, could offer 
positive returns. These could include purely informal visits by operators when off 
duty. At the very least, such venues offer an avenue for practicing language and 
learning about the history, culture, and perspectives of different groups with 
whom operators might later work. Practice in this context would also be far less 
threatening, politically or personally, than a similar experience in a sensitive 
deployed environment.  
6. Conventional Unit Interface 
It comes as little surprise that research for this thesis revealed a higher 
failure rate between SOF and U.S. partners than between SOF and foreign 
partners. Many of these failed exchanges were between SOF and conventional 
units working in the same area. Intentionally approaching potentially contentious 
U.S. partners before—or outside the context of—deployments offers inter-
organizational interpersonal lessons and provides a better learning platform 
without the risk of mission failure. Such relationship building also presents 
potential for an array of tangible long-term benefits.  
Many SOF personnel have difficulty operating with conventional partners. 
Rightly or wrongly, there is a pervasive belief among special operators that 
conventional units think of them as “cowboys” and have trouble understanding 
SOF’s way of doing business. Initiating some form of ongoing partnership with 
conventional units might aid in closing that cultural gap on both sides. This does 
not necessarily require mandated, unit-wide training events with other U.S. units, 
but could include relationship-building practices as simple as dropping in on 
neighboring units to make introductions and discuss any appropriate questions 
either unit may have about the other’s activities. These efforts can create space 
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for an ongoing dialogue about how and why SOF conducts business differently 
than conventional units, and how a SOF unit’s activities can integrate with a 
neighboring unit’s own work.  
7. Voluntary Foreign Aid Missions 
In the corporate world, some organizations allow a temporary leave of 
absence for one to two months so that employees can do volunteer work abroad. 
Certain political conditions and related constraints may not allow for this in SF. 
However, the concept is worth reviewing and considering as a form of permissive 
temporary duty for personnel so inclined. Ideally, such individuals could go to a 
country in their unit’s area of assignment and use their target language. As 
another benefit, interested operators could attend these events with family 
members. The USSOCOM Preservation of the Force Task Force is focused on 
relieving stress placed on marriages and families after years of combat 
deployments. Supporting such opportunities would serve this purpose and 
simultaneously develop cross-cultural interpersonal skills, language capability, 
and cultural knowledge at the operator level.  
8. New Context for Formal Unit Functions 
Like many military units, SF often holds Christmas balls or other annual 
formal unit functions. Units should consider holding these events in business or 
embassy attire and not just always in uniform. Operators are often asked to 
perform missions that require interfacing with embassies or related civilian 
government offices. Existing SF formals or other unit celebrations can be usefully 
leveraged to accustom operators to the most basic elements of civilian 
engagement, beginning with attire and ceremonial formalities within American 
culture, before a mission requires familiarity with such conventions. Units might 
even consider funding a single suit for operators not already owning proper 
civilian business attire, or coordinating with local men’s clothiers to host 
occasional “dress for success” events to help inform operators on this subject.  
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For better or worse, appearance can help establish initial common ground. 
Dressing in appropriate civilian attire under certain circumstances is no different 
than growing a beard or wearing traditional dress in Afghanistan. If operators fail 
this first test of cultural appropriateness, that failure can preclude them from 
advancing a relationship to the level at which they are able to employ other 
cross-cultural interpersonal skills.  
D. UNIT-FUNDED TRAINING 
The current era portends reduced funding for unique civilian specialty 
schools. SOF should still seek to extract useful skills and techniques from 
experienced organizations outside its realm whenever possible, and SOF units 
should continue to periodically send operators to various civilian training venues 
to learn negotiation, sales techniques, cross-cultural assimilation and 
interpersonal skills. These venues should not be limited to one or two select 
options. Units need to survey the full spectrum of training possibilities and 
sample various options, including those available through universities and private 
companies, to help diversify their operators’ frames of reference.  
Many business firms send senior leaders to courses offering relevant skill 
sets. By attending the same courses, operators could gain a wider perspective of 
how someone can successfully or unsuccessfully employ the skills presented. 
For example, an operator recently mentioned that he attended a course 
conducted by the Harvard Program on Negotiation. The instruction was useful, 
but the greatest value was gained in observing and interacting with civilian 
executives or automotive union representatives. They attacked problems in a 
different way, which offered him a perspective beyond normal SOF exposure.  
The military and SOF often use the phrase “train as you fight.” SOF 
operates with a minimal footprint in politically sensitive and culturally varied 
locations solving ambiguous problems through an indirect approach. Cross-
cultural interpersonal exposure to the other techniques mentioned in this thesis, 
beyond any second or third order benefits, would enable SOF to train as it fights.   
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E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that influencing others is a keystone of success for 
SOF. Operators are continuously in relationships and partnerships with myriad 
organizations, both U.S. and foreign, regardless of mission type or location. The 
SOF community, and USASOC specifically, endeavors to conduct strategic 
influence through a global SOF partnership, to serve as the U.S. Army’s experts 
in the human domain, to execute UW and to achieve success by, with, and 
through partnerships with foreign forces. Accomplishing these missions and 
optimizing SOF’s success relies heavily on cross-cultural interpersonal skills. The 
first-hand examples of operator experience presented in this thesis reinforce that 
message with a 28 percent failure rate at the interpersonal level. Applying the 
interpersonal lessons and concepts proposed here may help to raise the bar and 
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APPENDIX A.  ADDITIONAL CODING DATA  
Tables 5-11 below provide a collective overview of the codes and families 
used to develop each theme indicated within this thesis.  
 
Coding Process for Theme 1 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Genuine Behavior 
Action legitimizes forces 
Action not words 









Feeling obligation to return help 






Genuine interest in work at 
hand 
Giving not just taking 
Giving others credit 
Giving respect 
Going to bat for partner 




Importance of religious  
Knowledge 
Importance of religious role 
Justifying concern 
Kind gestures 
Making partner feel comfortable 
Non-appreciative partner 
Offering a solution 




Personal fascination with partner 
Personal loyalty 




Setting aside differences 
Showing empathy 
Sincere effort 
Surging influence collectively 
Taking the blame 





Value of friendship 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Success in handling interpersonal engagements or influencing partners is highly 
reliant on the presence of real or perceived genuine human concern and interest. This was 
identified by every operator in over 50 codes ranging from humility, compassion, appreciation, 
respect, genuine interest, giving, helping, and the like. Reference term is Genuine Behavior. 
 
Table 5. Coding Process Example (Theme 1) 
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Coding Process Example (Theme 2) 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Gaining Perspective 




Assessing the situation 
Closed-minded approach 




Frustration in understanding 
environment 
Introspective thought 
Knowing your strengths 










Partner connectivity with populace 
Partner embarrassed 
Perspective justification 




Understanding larger context 
Understanding options 
Understanding partner’s motivation 
Understanding environment 
Western viewpoint 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
 
The Theme: Taking a partner’s perspective or broadening/challenging one’s own – and related 
actions that aid in creating perspective, such as asking questions, listening, or developing 
dialogue – collectively serve as a major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements, and 
as a learning tool to understand failed encounters. This was identified by every operator in all 23 
source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking 
questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach. Reference term is 
Gaining Perspective. 
Table 6. Coding Process Example (Theme 2) 
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Coding Process for Theme 3 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Mutual Assistance 
Bond through hardship 
Common Ground 
Compromising to find a solution 
Connecting partners 
Creating common ground 
Emotional connection through 
hardship 
Face to face solution 
Hand in hand with partner 













The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
 
The Theme: Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with partners, to include acting as 
a mediator between partners to enhance their mutual support, facilitates a higher level of 
collective understanding and positively impacts an individual’s ability to influence others. This was 
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes such as 
mutual learning, creating common ground, reciprocal value, and shared concerns. Reference 
term is Mutual Assistance. 
Table 7. Coding Process Example (Theme 3) 
Coding Process for Theme 4 











Collectivist cultural indications 
Military culture 






The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an effective conduit in 
creating genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing successful relationships. This was 
identified by 19 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such cultural challenges, cultural 
difference, sectarian rivalry, and authority reinforcement. Reference term is Culturally Aware 
Behavior.  
Table 8. Coding Process Example (Theme 4) 
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Coding Process for Theme 5 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Building Social Capital 
Cultural similarity 
Cultural misinterpretation 






Collectivist cultural indications 
Military culture 






The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Managing relationships that result in influence requires taking an approach that 
builds upon how a partner is perceived by others in the surrounding organization or community as 
well as themselves. This was identified by all 20 operators and contains 30 subordinate codes 
such as adaptability, boosting partner ego, humor, selling, and building others’ social capital. 
Reference term is Building Social Capital.   
 
Table 9. Coding Process Example (Theme 5) 
Coding Process for Theme 6 
The Family Codes within the Family 
Hanging Out 
Attempt to dialogue 
Distance makes difficult 
Drinking with partners 
Extracurricular activity 




Living with partners 
Meal sharing 




Strength of personal relationship 
Value of hanging out 
Value of meal sharing 
Valued socializing 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Learning about others through hanging out beyond work is a significant catalyst for 
successful cross-cultural interpersonal influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators 
and contains 18 subordinate codes such as playing sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol, and 
living with partners, among others. Reference term is Hanging Out. 
 
Table 10. Coding Process Example (Theme 6) 
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Coding Process for Theme 7 




Bypassing HN leadership for a 
solution 
Command pressure 
Constraints of low rank or 
experience 
Lack of continuity 
Less bureaucratic constraints 
Limited time and manning 
No career risk 
Outside prescribed duties 
Overcome bureaucratic 
constraints 
Partner bureaucratic constraints 
Partner requests return 
Political barriers to helping partners 
Political constraints 




Results of bureaucratic constraints 
Shifting U.S. priorities 
Transitioning Units 
Turnover Issues 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely encountered within our own system 
and that of our partners will reduce a large barrier to effective influence. This theme was identified 
by all 20 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as transitioning units, lack of 
continuity, and pressure from higher authority. Reference term is Overcoming Bureaucratic 
Constraints. 
 
Table 11. Coding Process Example (Theme 7) 
Coding Process for Theme 8 




Deconflicting Between Partners 
Multi Group Coordination 
Mixed Groups 
 
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme. 
The Theme: Employment as a SOF operator requires ability to simultaneously manage 
relationships and influence with multiple organizations and individuals. This theme was identified 
by 17 operators in one code. Reference term is Multi-Group Coordination. 
 
Table 12. Coding Process Example (Theme 8) 
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APPENDIX B.  ADDITIONAL FIGURES 
This appendix offers additional supporting tables beyond those provided in 
the main text. The table below presents a review of data associated with the 96 
stories collected of interpersonal engagement experiences by SOF operators. 
  
STORY DATA OVERVIEW 
Story Type Number of Stories % of All Stories 
Foreign Engagements 72 75 
U.S. Engagements 24 25 
Positive Outcome (Foreign Partner) 54 75 
Positive Outcome (U.S. Partner) 15 62.5 
Positive Process – Positive Outcome 63 65.6 
Negative Process – Positive Outcome 6 6.3 
Total Positive Outcome 69 71.9 
Negative Outcome (Foreign Partner) 18 25 
Negative Outcome (U.S. Partner) 9 37.5 
Positive Process – Negative Outcome 1 1 
Negative Process – Negative Outcome 26 27 
Total Negative Outcome 27 28 
Pre SOF Engagements 19 19.8 
Iraq Engagements 42 43.7 
Afghanistan Engagements 13 13.5 
Other Country Engagements 41 42.7 
Total Engagements 96 N/A 
Engagements occurred in 23 total countries including 3 in the U.S.  
See Table 4 for details concerning engagements per country. 
Table 13. Story Data Overview 
The following table presents a comprehensive list of subject data. No real 
names were used in this document in order to preserve anonymity of the 
subjects.  
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SUBJECT DATA FOR 20 OPERATORS INTERVIEWED 
SOF Organization Rank and Total by 
Organization 
Recent Units of Service 
U.S. Army Special Forces 16 (14 x MAJ, 1 x SFC, 1 
x CWO3) 
USASFC(A) x 1, SOTD(A) 
x 1, SWTG(A) x 2, 1st 
SFG(A) x 2, 
5th SFG(A) x 5, 7th SFG(A) 
x 2, 
10th SFG(A) x 2 
U.S. Army Ranger 1 (1 x MAJ) 75th RGR(A) x 1 
U.S. Navy SEAL 3 (3 x LCDR NSWG1 x 1, USSOCOM x 
2 
 
Rank Years of 
Service 
Years in SOF Deployments Months Deployed 
MAJ 10 4 4 29 
MAJ 11 5 4 36 
MAJ 12 6 4 29 
MAJ 19 5 6 42 
MAJ 12 6 2 29.5 
SFC 12 12 5 29 
LCDR 12 12 11 49 
MAJ 16 10.5 3 10 
MAJ 12 12 7 39.5 
CW3 17 14 13 64 
MAJ 15 7 5 48 
MAJ 10 5.5 4 24 
MAJ 12 4.5 6 42 
MAJ 11 5 6 31 
LCDR 14 14 15 60 
MAJ 12 6 4 31 
LCDR 11 11 4 33 
MAJ 11 5 5 20 
MAJ 11 6 4 29 
MAJ 21 8 5 38.5 
 





Average Total Average Total 
13.05 261 7.9 158 5.9 117 35.7 713.5 
Table 14. Complete Subject Data 
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APPENDIX C. RECOMMENDED READING 
READING RECOMMENDATIONS 
Title Author Overview 
How to Win Friends and 
Influence People 
Dale Carnegie The title says it all. Written in the 
30s, but the techniques are 
justified and work well. 
Global Dexterity: How to 
Adapt your Behavior 
across Cultures Without 
Losing yourself in the 
Process 
Andy Molinsky Explains how to identify minimal, 
reasonable efforts to adapt and 
work with other cultures. 
The Cultural Intelligence 
Difference 
David Livermore Tips to assessing and improving 
your ability to effectively 
navigate other cultures. 
Say Anything to 
Anyone: 5 Keys to 
Successful Cross-
Cultural Communication 
Gayle Cotton Good examples on how to 
analyze and adapt to a situation 
to achieve success with other 
cultures 
In the Midst of Wars: An 
American’s Mission to 
Southeast Asia 
Edward Lansdale Tangible examples of influence 
from possibly the best military 
advisor in history. 
The Ugly American Eugene Burdick 
William Lederer 
Tangible story explaining how 
Americans are often perceived 
overseas and why that happens. 
A Bell for Adano John Hersey Tangible story about an Army 
Major in WWII who earns the 
respect of a small Italian town. 
Demonstrates effective influence 
and advising. 
Appreciative Inquiry: A 





How to use questions effectively 









How to understand and apply 
the foundational principles of 
Emotional Intelligence. 
Getting to Yes: 
Negotiating Agreement 




Good foundational book on 
negotiation. Yury co-founded 
Harvard’s Program on 
Negotiations. 
Confidential John Nolan Effective elicitation techniques 
that sometimes aid in influence. 
Defense is from Mars 





Rickey Fife Understanding organizational 
cultural differences between 
DOD and DOS. PDF available 
via Google search. 
Table 15. Recommended Reading 
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APPENDIX D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the interest of exploring the value in identifying specific recurring 
interpersonal skills of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators, we can turn to 
related research on the psychology of negotiations, cross-cultural behavior, and 
interpersonal behavior. Additional specific research reviews and offers instruction 
in skills that practitioners commonly employ in successful negotiations or rapport 
building. Numerous authors and experts have suggested that by learning and 
adopting specific behaviors, most people can acquire the skills necessary for 
successful rapport building or negotiation; these skills include mimicry, posture, 
attitude, neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) and understanding perspective, 
among others.66 Many of these skills seem reasonably simple to understand and 
apply when one is merely reviewing them, but they can be difficult to employ or 
detect when they are applied in daily encounters. This raises the question of 
whether people have a genetic predisposition for these skills, whether they can 
be inculcated through practice and exposure, or whether some combination of 
the aforementioned avenues is most accurate. As an example, in The Tipping 
Point, Malcolm Gladwell suggests that select individuals referred to as 
connectors, mavens, and salespeople have special traits that enable them to 
collectively influence social change.67  
This leads to two questions of primary concern. Does conclusive research 
validate the possibility of a predisposed ability in these areas? Furthermore, to 
what extent can we identify recurring skills or attributes through the analysis of 
concrete encounters and use them to leverage improved capability in members 
66 Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People (New York: Pocket Books, 1936); 
Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1991); Nicholas Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds 
(New York: Workman Publishing, 2002); Michael Brooks, Instant Rapport (New York: Warner 
Books, 1989); Tom Hopkins, Selling for Dummies (New York: Hungry Minds, Inc., 2001); and 
David Lieberman, Get Anyone to do Anything and Never Feel Powerless Again (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000).  
67 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2002). 
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of the SOF force who lack a biological predisposition? This research effort 
suggests that these skills can be identified and recommendations for 
improvement can be developed to the extent they pose no risk to mission 
success. A review of the corresponding psychological research indicates the 
presence of additional, often more complex dynamics that can influence the 
outcome of interpersonal engagements, thereby requiring more complex 
behavioral manipulation beyond a simple overlay of certain skills.68  
The understanding of individual interpersonal skills has a long history 
within the field of psychology. Negotiation and mediation, or arbitration, have 
been the principal tools for exploring related behaviors. Early studies on 
negotiation focused specifically on individual differences between involved 
parties on each side and how these might determine outcomes. Some instances 
highlighted the significance of individual differences, but they were inadequate for 
defining the true outcome of a scenario due to other environmental factors, such 
as the context for the scenario in question.69 
Further studies concerning behavioral decision research (BDR) explored 
how negotiators and their opponents often deviate from what is perceived to be 
the rational thought process accorded to the situation. This research indicates 
that creating accurate descriptions of opponents has value over an assumption of 
their rational thought process.. In support of these findings, BDR argues that 
cognitive heuristics often lead to diversion from the rational thought process.70 
This applies most appropriately in the cultural context, where definitions of 
rational behavior may not align. Success or failure is often tied to culturally-
shaped behavior. As Gladwell illustrates in Blink, people can be conditioned to 
make effective or destructive snap decisions or assessments.71 
68 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 279–314. 
69 Ibid., 281.  
70 Ibid., 282. 
71 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking within Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2005). 
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Perspective is very difficult to grasp, especially when multiple interacting 
perspectives are in play. Understanding perspective is a significant dynamic 
identified by numerous research efforts as crucial to success in interpersonal 
engagements.72 Related studies on two-party negotiations indicate that 
participants display a variety of consistent behaviors, such as failing to see the 
opponent’s perspective, making false assumptions, and failing to realize the true 
flexibility of the situation and the possibility of mutual benefit.73 Some negotiators 
have been consistently found to act in a less objective, more motivationally-
biased manner. This motivational bias is known as egocentrism; the more each 
party possesses this trait, the more difficult an outcome of agreement becomes. 
Situations characterized by increased ambiguity show higher levels of 
egocentrism, whereas scenarios possessing greater symmetry, as in scenarios 
where the parties possess some understanding of each other, reveal fewer signs 
of egocentrism. In addition, when negotiators have a more accurate perspective 
of their opponent, they become more objective in their efforts to resolve the 
issue.74  
Mental models also play a role in understanding how perspective, or the 
lack thereof, can impact a negotiation. A mental model is one individual’s 
perception of the entire process and the perceived outcomes.75 For example, 
studies show that regardless of the scenario, participants assume that their goals 
are in direct opposition to those of their negotiating counterparts, even in 
scenarios where shared interests also exist. Understanding other possible 
scenarios through the use of compared analogies showed success against the 
pure experience of sequential scenarios. Participants were then able to adapt 
72 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 279–314; Bond and Smith, “Cross-
Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 205-235; Dale Miller and William Turnbull, 
“Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes,” Annual Review of Psychology 37 (1986): 236-237; 
Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 491-515; Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruitt, 
“Negotiation and Mediation,” Annual Review of Psychology 43 (1992): 551-552. 
73 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 282. 
74 Ibid., 284-285. 
75 Ibid., 287. 
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these analogies to better understand future scenarios and apply lessons. 
Similarly, people tend to exaggerate differences between themselves and their 
opponents based on mental models. Actions also differ based on an 
understanding of participant roles, such as friend or businessperson.76 The 
process of Appreciative Inquiry (AI), developed to enhance organizational 
collaboration, reinforces the value of understanding perspective through asking 
questions to identify common, positive ground and clarify a path forward.77   
Cross-cultural behavior makes each of these issues more complicated. 
Cultural differences are perhaps the most frequently discussed theme among the 
many challenging elements of cross-cultural negotiation. For instance, cultural 
differences can refer to the diverging worldviews of individualist cultures like the 
United States and collectivist cultures like the Philippines. In cross-cultural 
negotiations involving one party from each cultural type, the individualist places a 
higher value on solving the issue at hand, while the collectivist places more value 
on maintaining positive relations.78 The collectivist prioritizing of relationship 
maintenance often involves indirect communication—sometimes perceived by 
individualists as deception—and is the source of what we know as “saving 
face.”79 Other relevant dimensions of cross-cultural negotiation are 
communication context (unmentioned contextual value of conversation versus 
direct meaning of words used), power distance (position within a hierarchy), and 
time concept (polychromic versus monochromic).80 Each of these variables 
requires an astute interpersonal navigator to detect and be prepared to adjust 
their own mental models to the environment. Typically, countries fall on opposite 
ends of the spectrum in more than one category of cross cultural negotiation, 
76 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 279–314; Bond and Smith, “Cross-
Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 205-235. 
77 Frank J. Barrett and Ronald E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building 
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications, 2008).  
78 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 279–314; Bond and Smith, “Cross-
Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 205-235; Thompson, Wang and Gunia, 
“Negotiation,” 491-515. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, “Negotiation,” 297-98. 
 92 
                                            
thereby creating multiple opportunities for failure within a given scenario. These 
dynamics are also measured through a system known as self-concept clarity 
(SCC), a scale on which individuals from collectivist cultures are hypothesized to 
demonstrate lower values than those from individualist cultures, in which SCC is 
prized and pervasively articulated.81  
These dynamics reinforce the idea that cross-cultural negotiation varies 
widely from same-culture scenarios. Research indicates that intercultural 
negotiations resulted in lower mutual value than those with intra-cultural groups. 
Participants identified this issue as a result of less accurate understanding of 
each other’s priorities. This can be attributed to the previously mentioned 
concerns of perspective and mental models. Some studies suggest prescriptive 
advice, such as being prepared to assume other mental models. However, others 
questioned the ability of most people to separate from cultural grounding and 
change behavior to the extent required to make their situational outcome 
successful. In Global Dexterity, Andy Molinsky acknowledges this difficulty and 
identifies six key areas where cultural clashes can occur.82 He then suggests a 
reasonable process for adopting minimal behavioral change to assimilate without 
losing one’s own cultural identity.83 Similarly, even within the specific field of 
cross-cultural psychology—which, both notably and similarly to traditional 
psychology, is dominated by Americans—there is an ongoing awareness of the 
potential influence of culture on research.84 To confront these issues, this 
specialized field focuses on universals, which are demonstrated psychological 
principles that have survived the test of cross-cultural analysis.85  
One related study concerning universals theorizes that a specific set of 
five dimensions can be used to assess and compare perceived personalities 
81 Bond and Smith, “Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 205-235. 
82 Andy Molinsky, Global Dexterity: How to Adapt Your Behavior Across Cultures Without Losing 
Yourself in the Process (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2013), 48-50. 
83 Ibid., 5-182. 
84 Bond and Smith, “Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 205-235. 
85 Ibid. 
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from varied cultures. The five dimensions include extroversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience.86 Different 
cultures weigh the relative importance of each quality differently, which confirms 
the value of objectivity in dealing with other cultures. Further studies addressed 
the decision-making skills of managers within collectivist versus individualist 
cultures.87 These studies found collectivists more apt to work well in teams and 
to consult leaders. Conversely, the individualists focused less on teamwork and 
were less likely to consult a supervisor.  
Similar to the notion of mental models, outcomes in interpersonal actions 
have a high correlation to the expectations of the parties involved.88 For 
example, people having phone discussions with women whom they believed to 
be attractive consistently assessed them as more sociable than those who were 
believed unattractive.89 In short, humans show a pattern of ability to conform 
their behavior to achieve expected results, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Negotiations offer similar results, where action begets action. An opponent 
believed to be competitive, for example, begets more competition, which 
reinforces the cycle.90 Although this appears commonly in research, it should be 
understood that disconfirming prophecies also exist; the outcomes are based on 
perceptions and expectations of each party and their reactions to the behavior of 
the other.91  
Integrative negotiation techniques further explore the value of perception. 
When negotiating, a participant often incorrectly perceives what the other person 
wants, resulting in less than optimal outcomes for both.92 This reconfirms that 
perspective and objectivity allow for more effective and integrated solutions. 
86 Ibid., 216. 
87 Bond and Smith, “Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology,” 221. 
88 Miller and Turnbull, “Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes,” 236-237. 
89 Ibid., 236. 
90 Ibid., 237. 
91 Ibid., 243. 
92 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 491-515. 
 94 
                                            
Interpersonal relations have been assessed in terms of various forms of 
influencing factors. One commonly cited combination of tactics for success is 
behavioral synchronization and body mimicry.93 Mimicry is another subtle form of 
placing oneself in the same interpersonal plane as another and working through 
body movement, tone of voice and nature of language.94 On a different note, 
emotions also play a part in negotiation. Thompson, Wang, and Gunia’s research 
indicates that one side is not affected by emotion of the other unless they have 
motivation to be so influenced.95 These observations were focused on 
negotiations, whereas other observations focused strictly on relationship building 
were consistent in finding success with a friendly approach versus an angry or 
aggressive one.96  
Collective identity is also an avenue of influence. People consistently 
identify more closely with others within their own perceived group, because this is 
seen as good for the collective in some fashion.97 Collectivists focus on relational 
trust and value versus the actual profit or individual form of gain received from 
the outcome.98 Collectivist sensitivity to out-group negotiation is, 
correspondingly, higher than that of an individualist.99 Negotiation is sometimes 
assumed to be more successful for the party that retains information. However, 
research has indicated dyads that share information concerning the discussion 
will also have higher outcomes.100  
93 Ibid., 499. 
94 Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds; Carnegie, How to Win Friends and 
Influence People; Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 491-515  
95 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 499. 
96 Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds; Carnegie, How to Win Friends and 
Influence People. 
97 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 502. 
98 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, “Negotiation,” 502; Michele Gelfrand, Miriam Erez, and Zeynep 
Aycan, “Cross-Cultural Organizational Behavior,” Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 579-
514. 
99 Ibid., 570. 
100 Carnevale and Pruitt, “Negotiation and Mediation,” 551-552. 
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In conclusion, successful management of interpersonal engagements 
requires not only precise knowledge of various behavioral dynamics, but also the 
ability to maintain a high level of objectivity as well as some level of behavioral 
control. Further studies of real-world interpersonal engagements conducted by 
special operators, in combination with psychological data concerning the training 
and selection of these men, will assist in better understanding the dynamics 
driving such scenarios. A refined appreciation for the interpersonal subtleties in 
action within a specialized SOF sample populace will ultimately improve 
operators’ abilities to influence their counterparts, likely reducing risk while 
increasing mission success. This effort is further legitimized by research that 
identifies the successful interpersonal traits of contemporary special operators, or 
suggests some measure of implementation to influence force-wide effectiveness 
in related scenarios. Similarly, within SF, current selection procedures are heavily 
focused on eliminating those who do not already possess requisite baseline 
capabilities for training, as opposed to identifying and developing potential.101 As 
a result, the process is disinclined to select “in” for certain skills or nascent 
abilities and does not currently have a procedure for measuring cross-cultural 
interpersonal skills.102 The process does effectively identify a baseline presence 
of emotional intelligence or interpersonal skills. Although necessary and readily 
applicable, this baseline primarily reflects a candidate’s ability to work effectively 
within a cohort of like personnel, and is insufficient for predicting or nurturing a 
capacity for handling the cross-cultural engagements required within this 
occupational realm.  
101 Major, U.S. Army Medical Corps, Special Forces Group Psychologist and former 1st SWTG 
(A) psychologist (phone discussion with author concerning ability to psychologically assess SF 
operators with interpersonal skills, February 21, 2012); Captain R., 1st SWTG (A) psychologist 
(email to author concerning interpersonal skills evaluation within Special Forces Assessment and 
Selection, March 13, 2013).  
102 Executive summary of individual criteria and ratings for U.S. Army SFAS (email to author 
from SFAS commander, February 18, 2013).  
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A. RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY:  
For this thesis, the investigation into the human dynamics pertinent to 
interpersonal success as a Special Forces (SF) operator pursued a process 
known as thematic analysis, as described by Dr. Richard Boyatzis in 
Transforming Qualitative Information. This process allowed a methodological 
approach to qualitative data collection, which facilitated analysis in both 
qualitative and quantitative forms. Because this specific use of thematic analysis 
endeavored to analyze situations encountered by experienced operators, it lent 
itself towards an inductive approach.  
The inductive approach was used to collect information provided by 
experienced SF operators at a specified level of detail, which facilitated the 
maximum extraction of correlative data for further analysis. When outlining 
effective methods for an inductive approach, Boyatzis recommends use of the 
critical incident interview (CII).103 The CII is an interview method that extracts an 
extremely rich, detailed type of data that can then be used to gain insight into 
human experiences. This information is collected in a journalistic form, almost 
analogous to a movie script, in order to reduce the likelihood of excluding or 
distorting the experience due to bias or opinion of the person being 
interviewed.104 While the applicability of this technique to SF personnel 
interviews concerning operational experiences seems readily apparent, to date 
no interviews have been found that extracted information at the level of detail 
required for such in-depth analysis. 
CII products were used during this thesis for the analysis and extraction of 
themes. From these the intent was to derive a code for defining the interpersonal 
operator. At the most basic level, CII data was collected from scenarios in which 
personnel performed successfully, as well as from those in which they were 
unsuccessful. The latter category presents a unique challenge due to perceived 
103 Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information, 99-127.  
104 Ibid.; Richard E. Boyatzis, The Competent Manager: A Model for Effective Performance (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), 50-53.  
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exposure risk. Interviews from each subset, successful and unsuccessful, were 
analyzed for presence of themes within their own cohort. This series of themes 
was then compared across subsamples. Correlation facilitated the demonstration 
of overarching themes with certain characteristics present in successful 
scenarios. Those that existed across all samples were further reviewed for the 
development of labels, definitions, indicators of presence and differentiation 
demonstrating level of commonality within each subsample.105 Common themes 
across the subsets were used to develop a code. Once refined, this code 
endeavored to illustrate the traits possessed by an SF operator adept in 
interpersonal engagements. 
Understandably, this process leaves some room for question due to the 
author’s perceived ability to collect information that aligns with the research 
hypothesis. To assist in validating the process, CIIs were recorded via audio 
device and transcribed verbatim for review of precise interview material. 
Additionally, the author received training in conducting the CII process by 
working alongside another trained practitioner, further helping to ensure the 
thoroughness, validity and objectivity of the information 
 
105 Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information, 29-53. 
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